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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the prison experiences of Arthur Dunham, Harold Gray, Evan
Thomas, and other conscientious objectors to the First World War. It demonstrates that the
Federal government of the United States used scientific management techniques, including the
initiation of a discourse of 100% Americanism, the use of propaganda to spread this discourse,
and the use of this discourse to encourage Americans to keep their friends, neighbors, and
relatives under surveillance. These techniques were used together in order to create an American
“carceral state” that allowed the government to surveil and discipline its population in such a
way as to establish a hegemonic, pro-war attitude that enlisted the population in enforcing new
norms upon American society.
I argue that while the carceral state obtained compliance from a large portion of society,
it failed to persuade an important subset of Americans: sectarians. It argues that historians of
American religion have generally under theorized the divisions between American religious
groups, which has resulted in a progressive/conservative dichotomy that has placed responsibility
for American involvement in the First World War with Progressive Christians. Applying the
Church-Sect theory of Ernest Troeltsch, Max Weber, and H. Richard Niebuhr, I argue that both
Progressives and conservatives supported the war effort, and that it was those members of
society who held to a sectarian position (either religious or secular) which rejected American
social and culture norms and therefore, with them, involvement in the war, including the
rejection of conscription. Such an approach not only reframes the debate over responsibility for
the war, but calls on historians to pay closer attention to sectarian groups and their influence
upon American religious history.
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Introduction
The Saturday after Thanksgiving Day in 1918, Arthur Dunham stood handcuffed to the
bars of a dark, cold, solitary confinement cell in the basement of the Fort Leavenworth
Disciplinary Barracks in Leavenworth, Kansas, for twelve hours. Dunham was subject to the
hole because he was incarcerated at the U.S. Army’s military prison as a conscientious objector
(CO) to the First World War.1 Growing up Presbyterian and serving his church as an itinerant
minister, Dunham was an unlikely candidate for solitary confinement in what prisoners at
Leavenworth called “the hole.” Dunham was a social worker from Saint Louis, who had earned
his bachelor’s degree from Washington University in Saint Louis, and had recently earned an
M.A. in political science from the University of Illinois in 1917. With those degrees in hand,
Dunham was one of the most highly educated conscientious objectors in the entire army.
Despite Dunham’s education, his outspoken and outgoing nature, and his familiarity and
connections with the conscientious objectors that he was incarcerated with, Dunham’s
experience at Leavenworth has remained unexamined by historians. His witness against war was
overshadowed by Harold Studley Gray and Evan Thomas, both of whom were sons of
prosperous, well known families, and who both successfully published their memoirs. Gray
published his memoirs in the 1930s, as a caution against American involvement in what would
become the Second World War. Evan Thomas’ memoirs were published just months after his
death in 1974. However, while Thomas himself was not famous during his lifetime, his brother,
Norman Thomas, was the Socialist Party candidate for President in six subsequent elections after
the death of Eugene Debs in 1926. Conversely, Dunham wrote his memoirs shortly after he was
released from prison in 1919, and attempted to publish them in 1920. However, with the U.S.
1
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embroiled in the Red Scare during this time, as well as the onset of a general disillusionment
with “the war to end all wars,” Dunham was unable to find a publisher.
Dunham’s unpublished memoirs, which are held at the University of Michigan’s Bentley
Library, have been occasionally excerpted or referenced by scholars. However, most of his
writing has been ignored by historians of the First World War. This is unfortunate, because
Dunham’s correspondence during his incarceration, and his memoirs which were based upon
those letters, focused exclusively on the conditions of the camp where he was inducted, the CO
quarters he resided in for a short time, and then the guard house, and finally, the military prison
in which he was incarcerated. Dunham, as a social worker and as a student of human behavior,
described the conditions in the guard house and in the military prison more carefully than any
other chronicler of the period. Included in his correspondence and his memoirs were records of
his interactions with sectarians, both religious and secular, who opposed U.S. entry and
participation into the war in Europe. Dunham’s writings provide a unique perspective into the
conditions that COs and war resisters faced during the war years and their immediate aftermath.
Arthur Dunham knew both Harold Gray and Evan Thomas, but he also knew many of the other
COs to the war and went out of his way to chronicle his interactions with them.
Dunham’s observations of his fellow prisoners and conscientious objectors were so
exacting and distinct because, as a keen, trained sociological observer, he made note of the
beliefs, values, and experiences of his fellow inmates in greater detail. What emerges is a profile
not of the more visible liberal elite conscientious objector—such as Gray and Thomas—but of
the vast majority of COs, who were sectarians. In fact, at the start of the war, as both an
intellectual and as a member of the Presbyterian church, Dunham was not a sectarian himself.
Instead, his experience with the Army war machine arguably made him one. He left the

3
Presbyterian church to become an independent Christian, and ultimately, a Quaker. His
observations, and his own life trajectory, give us a unique window on the CO experience that
helps us understand the centrality of sectarianism to conscientious objection in the United States.
From his experiences, we can see how sectarians—the largest group of anti-war Americans after
the declaration of war in April 1917—understood and faced the conflict.
The government used scientific management techniques, including the initiation of a
discourse of 100% Americanism, the use of propaganda to spread this discourse, and the use of
this discourse to encourage Americans to keep their friends, neighbors, and relatives under
surveillance.2 These techniques were used together in order to create an American “carceral
state” that allowed the government to surveil and discipline its population in such a way as to
establish a hegemonic, pro-war attitude that enlisted the population in enforcing new norms upon
American society.3 Stated another way, the federal government succeeded in policing its
population by convincing the population to police itself.
However, while the government convinced its population to police itself once the U.S.
took up arms against Germany, this group of techniques failed to control one group of American
citizens: sectarians. I will argue that sectarians—such as Arthur Dunham—made up the vast
majority of conscientious objectors in the United States after the declaration of war in April of

2
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1917.4 Historians of American religion up to this point have argued over whether “progressive”
or “conservative” churches were more to blame for religious support of the conflict. I will argue,
however, that applying the Church-Sect typology of Troeltsch, Niebuhr, and others to the
religious groups in America in 1917 will help break this false dichotomy and will demonstrate
that the majority of religious opposition to WWI came from sectarian Christians—such as Arthur
Dunham—while the majority of religious support for the war came from both modernist and
fundamentalist groups who came together behind Woodrow Wilson in order to cheer on
American arms under the banner of messianic interventionism.5
Furthermore, I will argue that by applying Church-Sect typology to “secular” categories
such as socialists, anarchists, and Wobblies, it will become clear that war resisters, whether
religious or secular, were part of sectarian groups.6 I define a group as a “sect” or as “sectarian”
if they are indifferent or antagonistic to the larger values of their culture; which focuses inwardly
towards itself and its members, in order to ensure purity of doctrine or political belief; which
rejects the domination of the larger world around them through the use of state coercion; and
which seeks to transform society through convincing others to join their movement, and then, the
eventual replacement of the institutions of society with those of the group.7 Furthermore, many,

4
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but not all, sectarian groups, are led by a charismatic leader.8 As such, groups including
anarchists, non-state Marxists, and many new religious movements fit this category. This is not
to say that sectarians and their institutions are not political, or that they do not involve
themselves in the public sphere. Sectarian groups may or may not visibly participate in the
politics of the day. Instead, the hallmark of the sectarian is their antagonism to the wider culture.
The story of the incarceration of Arthur Dunham and his associates helps to provide a
window into the historiography of religion and war, and provides ample narrative evidence for
these arguments. Dunham, as an “independent,” sectarian Christian, opposed the war due to his
convictions that war and killing were immoral. Dunham as a social worker and political scientist,
viewed the government’s management of the war, the population, and COs through the lens of
the Progressivism, of which he was a dyed-in-the-wool adherent.
While historians of war and society have examined the First World War in detail,
historians of religion and war have spent less ink on the conflict.9 Any survey of the
historiography of religion and the Great War must begin with sociologist Ray Abrams’
monograph, Preachers Present Arms. Writing in 1933, Abrams sought to fill a gap in the
literature, because of the books written about the war up until that time, “few have been
concerned with the integral relationship of the civilian population to the whole configuration of

8
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war.” To do so, Abrams chose as a sample group “the clergy and the churches of the United
States,” 10 While Abrams’ book focused mostly on the clergy, he carefully balanced this focus on
them by showing how their actions impacted the average person in the U.S., and he especially
studied the effects felt by those marginalized by the nation’s war machine and propaganda.
Abrams presented an unflattering picture of the clergy during the war, arguing that much
of the clergy was intimately involved in pushing the U.S. to enter the war on the side of Great
Britain.11 Abrams used the concept of social control, which are the means that a society uses to
ensure conformity with societal norms, to analyze the actions of the clergy. He concluded that
the clergy, in collusion with the government, played an active role in extending federal
hegemony over almost every facet of life in order to ensure full cooperation with the war effort.12
In so doing, the clergy not only contributed to a rise of nationalism, but they also contributed to
the general war-time hysteria and became part of the national propaganda machine.13 Abrams’
work, taken as a whole, showed generally that many of the churches put themselves squarely in
the service of the government during the war.
A response to Abrams did not come until 1965, when John F. Piper wrote a dissertation
to challenge Abrams’ findings. Piper argued that Abrams described the churches of the period as
having whole heartedly “sold out” to the American propaganda machine during the war, and that
most students of religion had bought into this line of thinking. According to Piper, however,
“The primary difficulty with the sell-out theory has been and continues to be that it has very little

10
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validity. In fact, there is no reason to give it any credence except as an artifact of historical
interpretation.”14 With one quick sweep in this short article that shares a name with that of his
later published dissertation revised into monograph, Piper set up a caricature of Abrams’
argument and then just as quickly dismissed it as a mere historical construction.
Piper, though, had more issues with Abrams’ text than just what he perceived to be its
thesis. Objecting strongly to Abrams’ claim of being an objective social scientist, Piper claimed:
he approached his subject with a strong pacifist bias and a determination to show that not only the war but
all those who shared in it were morally wrong. The singlemindedness [sic] of his work helped him establish
his point and also led him to misunderstand much of the churches’ ministry. The discovery of acculturation
in the churches’ wartime work was like finding sand on a beach. … What Abrams missed was the work and
testimony of those who accepted the war but who agonized over their roles, who sought a national wartime
ministry that would lift up the Gospel, and who also gradually came to realize that the struggle had changed
life for them and their institutions.15

While it is obvious that Abrams wrote from a biased point of view, it is difficult to substantiate
the claim that he “misunderstood much of the churches’ ministry.” Abrams’ interest in writing
had not been to discuss the church as a totality, but to highlight how the government was able to
co-opt the clergy as instruments of social control, and to demonstrate how the clergy had acted as
a barometer for what was occurring in the culture at large.16
While Piper outlined and caricatured the role of the clergy in the politics of the nation,
Richard M. Gamble fully fleshed out this role in his book The War for Righteousness:
Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation. Gamble began by
critiquing Abrams sociological approach in one sentence, before stating his thesis that “the
liberal clergy were not merely lackeys in the Wilson administration's attempts at social control,

14
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nor were they caught unaware and unprepared by the outbreak of war; rather, these forwardlooking clergy embraced the war as a chance to achieve their broadly defined social gospel
objectives."17 Gamble saw the clergy as willing government agents, acting to secure their own
agenda. Gamble also summed up Piper’s work in a single sentence, and used Piper’s argument to
bolster his own, stating that “the Protestant denominations contributed to the war effort in some
very practical and visible ways—through relief work and various ministries to the soldiers at
home and abroad…”18 Gamble argued that this relief work and the various ministries aligned
with the Social Gospel of the progressive clergy, which would allow them to baptize the conflict
as a progressive war of Christian messianism to the nations.
Gamble searched for an interventionist, crusading progressive clergy to hold responsible
for the war, and this is exactly what he found. Gamble argued that without a clergy that saw the
Kingdom of God as synonymous with western culture, a total war in Europe could not have
occurred. Gamble saw the intellectual arguments for “a war to end all wars” coming primarily
from the clergy. Like Abrams, he saw the clergy as participating in the propaganda machine,
pushing American interventionism, and doing so because they believed it would help them to
fulfill their goals in spreading their own form of an American gospel worldwide. As such,
Gamble argues, the clergy were not simply the tools of the government, but participants in the
Progressive machine for controlling and shaping both American politics and society.
Gamble, however, recently changed his mind about the responsibility of progressives for
the war. In a recent book chapter, he argued against a liberal-conservative dichotomy, with
progressives being the ones who supported the war effort. Instead, Gamble proposed an

17
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evangelical versus confessional dichotomy, with evangelicals largely endorsing an American
Civil Religion in the hopes that the war would “be a global force for righteousness.”19 As
evidence that he was incorrect, Gamble pointed to an article titled “No False Peace,” which was
an open letter originally published in the Outlook and which was subsequently republished in
many different journals in 1917. The article called on President Wilson to reject any peace that
did not result from an allied decisive victory, and also to resist the efforts of pacifists to keep the
U.S. out of the conflict. The letter was signed by an amalgam of progressive and fundamentalist
ministers and religious leaders, including the conservative itinerant preacher Billy Sunday, and
progressives such as Lyman Abbot and Harry Emerson Fosdick.20
After questioning whether or not the label “evangelical” was a useful description in
trying to understand the majority of American Christians, Gamble suggested that using the
categories of Paul Kleppner would be more fruitful. Gamble thus proposed to examine the
churches through a “pietist-confessionalist continuum” instead of through a lens of progressive
versus conservative.21 Pietist Christians, under a broad definition, include Methodists, Baptists,
many Lutherans (especially from Scandinavia), Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and the
Disciples of Christ. Confessionalists, in contrast, include Catholics, the Orthodox, some
Lutherans, and Anglicans. Gamble saw the Pietists as having an interest in perpetuating “a
cultural and morally Christian America,” while the Confessionalists had less of a cultural stake
in the maintenance of an American “Christian identity.”22 Gamble suggested that if historians

19
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embrace this “pietist-confessionalist continuum,” that they might find something new. Gamble
argued, in a statement that deserves quotation at length, that if this work is done, that:
such a study might uncover a group of apolitical preachers who cared for their flock on Sunday, 8 April
1917—the Sunday after Congress declared war—much as they had done every Sunday before. . . Perhaps
they prayed with particular urgency for those in authority in a time of national crisis and met the
extraordinary demands of a congregation whose sons had enlisted or would soon be drafted. But they never
thought of displaying the stars and stripes on or in their churches and certainly not draped across their
altars. They never included . . . “The Battle Hymn of the republic” in their order of worship. Instead, they
preached on the mission of the church and not the mission of America, took care not to confuse spiritual
and physical warfare, and never thought of interpreting God’s promises to Israel and to the church as if they
were meant for the united states. If such a group could be found for the First World War and all the way
back to the Revolutionary War and forward to the War on Terror, and that group turned out to be large,
then the entire narrative of American religious history, especially of religion and war, would have to be
retold.23

Gamble was correct that finding such a group would require a rewriting of American religious
history. However, it is highly unlikely that such a group will be found among Confessionalists.
If Gamble’s old dichotomy of progressive versus conservative was problematic (and the
fact that it was will be demonstrated below), his new dichotomy between Pietist and
Confessionalist was even more so. Paul Kleppner’s classic work, The Cross of Culture: A Social
Analysis of Midwestern Politics 1850-1900, argued that Pietists typically voted Republican, and
that Confessionalists tended to vote Democratic.24 However, Kleppner also showed through his
analysis of voting patterns that Southern Pietists also voted Democratic, often for reasons
surrounding race. However, Kleppner also demonstrated that these voting patterns changed
dramatically after the Depression of 1893, which created a complete realignment of voting
patterns. Therefore, Kleppner’s categories, while possibly being politically salient before 1893,
lack any meaning for the era of World War I politics. Gamble’s first false dichotomy, that of
conservative versus progressive Christians, was actually much more believable than his second.

23
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Gamble was not the only one who came to see that his dichotomy between Progressive
and Conservative Christians and support for the war effort was a false one. Andrew Preston
challenged Gamble’s thesis in The War for Righteousness in a chapter that recently appeared in
Beyond 1917: The United States and the Global Legacies of the Great War.25 Preston, who
apparently had not yet read Gamble’s revision of his own thesis which had appeared the year
before, argued against Gamble’s original dichotomy, demonstrating that conservatives were just
as much in favor of the war effort as Progressives. In fact, Preston argued that conservative
Christians provided “shrill and unquestioning support for America's cause.”26 Preston, in a larger
argument about whether the Great War caused a decline in American religion, declared that
“Conservative Protestants were never apolitical, and they never separated themselves from
American society to retreat into their own subculture.”27 Preston’s argument demonstrates, along
with Gamble’s, that historians of American religion have largely misunderstood the relationship
between American religious groups, and have neglected theory which would provide greater
clarity to what was occurring during the war. The social relations of American religious groups
to the world should be measured according to Sect-Church typology. According to H. Richard
Niebuhr, Max Weber, and Ernest Troeltsch, a religious group that separates itself from the larger
culture and retreats into its own sub-culture is a sect. Sects are, by definition, not liberal or
conservative. They stand apart from oppose the larger political and social institutions of the
dominant culture. Denominations, on the other hand, have made peace with the larger culture,
and share its values. Churches, the third Weberian ideal type, are dominant religious groups that

25
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claim universality and that often see citizenship as synonymous with church membership.28
Churches make significant accommodations to culture.29
The earliest sectarian groups appeared during the Reformation. Lutherans, as a renewal
movement of the Catholic church and as opposed to many of the dominant social values, would
have been the first sectarian group of the Reformation. Calvinist churches soon followed, along
with the Mennonites, Quakers, and the Church of the Brethren. However, as Troeltsch and
Niebuhr argue, most sectarian groups soon become denominations. Lutherans and Calvinists
quickly made peace with the dominant culture. Mennonites, Quakers, and the Church of the
Brethren, however, were able to resist such acculturating influences and became
“institutionalized sects,” which maintained their otherworldly stance while developing elaborate
systems of organization. In the U.S., with the dissolution of established churches, sectarian
groups, including what would become the institutionalized sects, flourished. Methodists,
Baptists, and Sandemanians were some of the first sects in the United States. However, by the
advent of the First World War, only the Sandemanians remained sectarian. In the early twentieth
century, a whole new group of sectarian groups emerged. These included, but are not limited to,
the Churches of Christ, various Pentecostal groups, Adventists, the International Student Bible
Association (later known as Jehovah’s Witnesses), and Christian Scientists.30
Most Sectarian groups, which were the chief religious opponents to American
participation in the war in 1917, were theological and political radicals. For example, in the

28
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Churches of Christ, a sectarian group that broke from the mainline, denominational Disciples of
Christ in 1906, most members were either socialists or anarchists. Not coincidentally, the sect
was also the largest pacifist group in America in 1917.31
Sectarian groups are typically anti-war. Denominational and Church typed religious
groups, however, are typically pro-war. This is easily seen by dividing groups into their
sect/denomination/church categories, and seeing which was and was not pro-war. Sectarian
groups in 1917 included Restorationists, Pentecostals, Holiness groups, Adventists, and the
International Bible Students Association. All five were anti-war, and members from all were
arrested and prosecuted for resisting the conflict.32 Denominational groups included Baptists,
Presbyterians, Methodists, and Congregationalists. None of the major denominations or churches
in the United States had a significant number of conscientious objectors or war resisters.
Having dealt with the original Gamble thesis, along with Preston’s corrective, let us
quickly return to Gamble’s new dichotomy, that of pietist versus confessional. Gamble’s
suggestion is based upon the work of Paul Kleppner and Frederick Luebke, but while arguing
that historians should examine this dichotomy more carefully, he provides no examples of this
idea in action. Since Gamble fails to apply the theory to the war, he leaves this work to other
historians. Since I have no argument of Gamble’s to analyze, I will propose my own. A look at
draft cards easily challenges Gamble’s suggestion. Jay Beaman, a sociologist of religion, has
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found close to 11,000 draft cards of conscientious objectors to World War I. Of this number,
sectarian groups make up 84.5% of CO draft cards. Comparatively, German Pietists and
Confessionalists make up just 0.6% of CO draft cards. Just due to their small numbers, it is easy
to dismiss a Pietest versus Confessionalist dichotomy as being the controlling paradigm for
understanding which religious Americans were for or against American intervention in the Great
War.33 The correct paradigm for understanding how religious groups responded to the war is that
of sect versus denomination. American religious groups on the whole, whether conservative or
liberal, denomination or church, supported the war effort once Congress declared war. It was
America’s sectarian groups, including Restorationists, Pentecostals, Holiness groups, and IBSA,
along with the Historic Peace Sects, such as the Mennonites, Quakers, and Church of the
Brethren, who opposed American entry to World War I.
Gamble’s new dichotomy can be further laid to rest by examining his claim that a study
of the Pietist-Confessional continuum “might uncover a group of apolitical preachers,” who did
not give into nationalism, did not wave the flag, and did not play the Battle Hymn of the
Republic. Gamble argued, “If such a group could be found for the First World War and all the
way back to the Revolutionary War and forward to the War on Terror, and that group turned out
to be large, then the entire narrative of American religious history, especially of religion and war,
would have to be retold.”34 In fact, such a group has been overlooked by American historians of
religion due to their improper over-focus on denominations and churches. However, this group is
not found among the Confessionalists, but among the Restorationist sectarians. Restorationist
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groups have a long heritage. The Sandemanians, a Restorationist group founded in Scotland in
1730, had congregations on the eastern seaboard of North America as early as 1750. These
Restorationists were brutally attacked during the American Revolution for being pacifists.35 The
Sandemanians, who died out in the U.S. in the late 19th Century, made a major impact on the
thought and theology of Alexander Campbell, one of the founders of the Stone-Campbell
Movement, which spawned the Churches of Christ, the Disciples of Christ, and the
Christadelphians. Campbell’s Movement in the U.S. can be dated to 1812, and it absorbed many
Sandemanian congregations.36 Both the Churches of Christ and the Christadelphians maintained
a fervent pacifistic theology throughout the American Civil War, World War I, and into World
War II. While Church of Christ pacifism has waned since World War II, the pacifism of the
group still exists in some quarters. 37 Christadelphians have also maintained their pacifism.
Furthermore, the events of World War I rekindled pacifism among the Disciples of Christ, a
group which remains at the forefront of the Christian peace movement in the U.S. today.38
Yet, while pacifist Restorationists have indeed existed throughout American history, they
have largely been ignored by historians. Sociologist R. Lawrence Moore, in his influential
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book, Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans, has argued that the Disciples of Christ
and the Churches of Christ, while being “denominations that have recently been granted mainline
status,” have “nonetheless remained on the edges of general narratives of American religious
history.”39 Finally, in regards to size, the Churches of Christ were the largest peace church in
America during World War I, and Restorationist sects and denominations, taken together,
continue to be one of the largest Protestant religious groups in the United States. Based on this
data, I would suggest that I agree with Richard Gamble’s analysis at least in one way: that the
entire narrative of American religious history, especially of religion and war, needs to be retold.
This thesis, which argues that sectarians made up the vast majority of conscientious objectors to
the First World War, provides one solid step in that direction.
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Chapter One: Setting the Table for War, Resistance, and Suppression
When what would become known as the First World War erupted in Europe in July of
1914, most Americans were stunned. “The impossible has happened,” declared the Christian
Century, one of the leading journals of mainline Christianity at the start of the war. The editor
continued, “The nations that have been leading in the world's progress have suddenly abandoned
their peaceful and productive pursuits to fly at each other's throats. The world looks on in horror
that lacks words for its expression.” America’s connections to Germany were particularly strong,
he explained, but America’s sympathies with England were also “deep.” He also stated, with
great hope, that the war would bring universal peace.40
Theodore H. Price of The Outlook also thought the war “unthinkable,” and therefore,
“impossible,” but declared that if hostilities did fully commence, the world would “revert to
primeval chaos and the reconstruction of civilization will have to be undertaken de novo.”41
Roland G. Usher at The Atlantic Monthly called the war “literally incomprehensible.”42
Arthur Dunham, who turned 21 just days after the declaration of war in 1914, and who had
recently finished a bachelor’s degree at Washington University in St. Louis, found the war to be
“far-off and unreal.”43 Soon, Dunham would find the war to be close to home and very real.
While some Americans, such as former President Theodore Roosevelt, urged the
government to prepare the United States to enter the conflict, most Americans wanted nothing to
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do with the European war.44 The editors of the Outlook, however, not only argued that the U.S.
should immediately engage in a preparedness campaign—specifically for the Navy—but that the
country should also seek commercial independence. Their plans included new laws that would
authorize the purchasing of foreign flagged ocean-going vessels by U.S. citizens for the purpose
of creating an American merchant fleet.45
But while politicians, businessmen, and the editors of major social, literary, and religious
journals quickly supported preparedness efforts, many ordinary Americans mobilized to oppose
both preparedness and any American involvement in the war. Michael Kazin has convincingly
argued that anti-war activists “organized the largest, most diverse, and most sophisticated peace
coalition to that point in U.S. history. Not until the movement to end the Vietnam War half a
century later would there be as large, as influential, and as tactically adroit a campaign against
U.S. intervention in another land. There has been none to rival it since.”46 These opponents
included much of the American public: socialists, radical union members from the International
Workers of the World, sectarian pacifists, progressive Christians, progressive secularists,
feminists, ethnic Germans, and many others who had no interest in the U.S. joining the fray.47
But while the majority of Americans opposed joining the war in 1914, a series of events
slowly worked to turn public opinion solidly against Germany, even if it did not convince most
Americans that the United States should enter the conflict when it did in 1917. At the beginning
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of the war, Great Britain began blockading German ports to prevent war material from the U.S.
and other neutral countries from reaching Germany. In retaliation and to prevent similar
materials from reaching England, German submarines attacked British ships, especially those
suspected of carrying munitions and war supplies. In 1915, a German submarine attacked and
sunk the RMS Lusitania, killing 1,198 souls, including 128 Americans. Americans were outraged
at the attack, even though Germany had warned the government that it planned to attack the ship,
and had even published written warnings in New York newspapers above and below
advertisements for the Lusitania.48 Germany quickly realized that such events would turn the tide
of public opinion against it, and subsequently ceased submarine warfare against civilian vessels
in order to keep the United States from joining the war on the side of the allies.49 As a
progressive Christian who was well educated, Dunham most likely supported President
Woodrow Wilson’s argument that Americans should be neutral in thought and in deed. However,
Dunham provided no extant evidence as to his attitude during this time.
Germany engaged in other reckless acts that raised American ire. German agents
sabotaged munitions plants. An American-born but German raised doctor engaged in biological
warfare, injecting American horses bound for the western front with anthrax and other toxic
substances, killing or crippling them. German agents also used explosives to destroy stockpiled
munitions on Black Tom Island in New Jersey.50 These actions not only angered many
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Americans, but also increased suspicion of German-Americans in the U.S., some of whom would
pay the price for these events during vigilante attacks. Even more ominous in the minds of many,
however, was the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans.
By late 1916, the German High Command came to believe that it needed to resume
unrestricted submarine warfare due to military setbacks, stalemates, and increasing shortages of
war material. Germany notified the United States that it would no longer restrict its submarines
to strictly military targets, which caused a severe public backlash against Germany in the United
States. Evan Thomas learned about the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare first hand,
when a passenger ship that he took home from England to the United States was attacked and
narrowly escaped being sunk by a German U-Boat.51
Additionally, the disclosure of the Zimmerman Telegram—and its attempt to bring
Mexico into the war against the United States if the U.S. chose to enter the conflict, infuriated
Americans and turned public opinion solidly against Germany. The British waited for a suitable
time to forward the telegram on to Washington, and Wilson then used the telegram when he
decided to break diplomatic relations with Germany and seek American entrance into the war.52
Wilson’s request for a declaration of war, however, was a major about-face in his policy. In
1914, he had quickly declared in 1914 that the United States was and would be a neutral party in
the European war.53 Michael Kazin has recently and convincingly demonstrated that the vast
majority of the country was against American entry into the war, both before and after Congress’
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declaration, and that the country saw “the largest, most diverse, and most sophisticated peace
coalition to that point in U.S. history.”54 In opposition to the established historiography that the
nation’s pacifists, conscientious objectors, and war resisters were isolationists, Kazin
demonstrates that this diverse group that opposed the war were in fact, in the words of Woodrow
Wilson, "progressive internationalists.”55 Thus, their opposition to the war was not simply
political, but instead, these groups believed for a variety of both religious and secular reasons
that killing, and war generally, was morally wrong.56
Arthur Dunham was just one among thousands who advocated peace after war broke out
in 1914. Dunham, and the many men and women who ended up incarcerated at Fort
Leavenworth and other prisons for resisting the war, in many ways perfectly illustrate Kazin’s
argument that the peace movement in 1917 was the largest and most diverse coalition for peace
that the country had ever seen.
Kazin makes this main argument, that the peace movement at the beginning of the war
was the largest in American history, by chronicling the bewildering amount of religious and
secular peace movements, demonstrations, letter writing campaigns, and other actions to attempt
to keep America out of the war from 1914 to 1917.57 Kazin then demonstrates that the entrance
of America in the war did not occur because of a failure of these movements, but instead,
because of the election of Woodrow Wilson. Kazin convincingly argues that because Wilson had
argued so much for peace, and because he had weathered the pro-war arguments of Republicans
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three years before his re-election, Progressives had a difficult time dealing with his about face in
the winter and spring of 1917. Kazin shows that many contemporaries believed that if Charles
Evans Hughes, the Republican candidate for President, had won instead of Wilson, most
Democrats in the House and Senate would most likely have not voted to go to war, and the
United States would had stayed out of the conflict.58
Since the majority of the country wanted to stay out of the war, Wilson had a serious
problem on his hands when he decided to ask Congress for a declaration of war in 1917. While
the resumption of submarine warfare, the Zimmerman Telegram, and the President’s own aboutface on the topic helped win many Americans over to Wilson’s side, it certainly did not win over
all, or even, according to Kazin, most Americans.
Wilson and Congress turned to the methods of social and cultural control to achieve those
goals, including the coercive power of the law. Historians such as Ray Abrams have shown that
Wilson’s attempts at social control included the criminalization of free speech, freedom of the
press, and overt acts that impeded the draft or the war effort. In order to force compliance,
Wilson unleashed the police powers of the federal government. He also urged congress to pass
laws to deal with what he saw as disloyalty. Congress reacted to Wilson’s prompts, and enacted
the Espionage Act in June of 1917, originally in order to criminalize espionage conducted by
foreign governments.59 The act was amended, however, by the passage of several acts in May of
1918 that came to be colloquially known as the Sedition Act.60 The sedition portions of the
Espionage Act were enacted largely in response to American citizens—and not foreign agents—
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who were critical of America’s entry into and involvement in the war in Europe. Congress
criminalized a number of speech acts, either verbally or in writing, which might “interfere with
the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States.”61 In practice once
these laws were passed, statements as innocuous as “the United States should have kept out of
this war,” were enough to land a person under federal investigation, and in many cases, these
simple words could and did lead to arrest and prosecution.62 The federal agencies tasked with
national security during World War I so thoroughly carried out their duties under the Espionage
and Sedition Acts that Jeanette Keith, historian of the American South, describes in her book,
Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight, the dragnet that followed as having an:
intensity and breadth of surveillance that heralded the birth of the American surveillance state. The Bureau
of Investigation, the Military Intelligence Division, and the American Protective League were not just
spying on leftists, feminists, pacifists, and immigrants—the ‘‘usual suspects’’ in the history of state
suppression of the American left—they were spying on just about everybody, with the gleeful compliance
of everybody’s neighbors… Curse the president, bad-mouth the Red Cross ‘‘ladies,’’ and before you knew
it, you had to account for your words to a federal agent. And not in New York or Washington, but in the
smallest, dustiest, crossroads towns in the rural South.63

The fact that the federal security apparatus worked so effectively was not lost upon government
officials. Attorney General Thomas Gregory saw federal enforcement and surveillance as so
efficient that he remarked approvingly that, “It is safe to say that never in its history has this
country been so thoroughly policed.”64
Citizens who opposed the war quickly found that Attorney General Gregory was correct.
During the nineteen months that the U.S. was involved in the war, the federal government
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indicted over 8,000 people for violation of the Selective Service Act65, imprisoned almost 3,000
men in “objector areas” in Army camps across the United States66, and prosecuted another 2,000
people under the Espionage and Sedition Acts.67 Hundreds of additional prosecutions against
civilians who opposed the war and the draconian prohibitions that it imposed were made under
other federal laws and regulations, including the “Threats Against the President Act,” laws
prohibiting violation of federal embargoes, the Neutrality Act, the Railroad Control Act,
harboring of deserting soldiers, and new laws against the sale of alcohol to military personnel.68
Courts also prosecuted many service members for being absent without leave, for desertion, and
for mutiny against naval officers on the high seas.69 By my estimate, at least 15,000 people were
prosecuted by the federal government for war related crimes, or over 26 people per day over the
course of U.S. involvement in the conflict. Several hundred others were arrested and prosecuted
under the United States Code of Military Justice, as well as state sedition and criminal
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syndicalism laws across the U.S.70 The majority of the federal criminal statutes under which
these men and women were investigated, arrested, indicted, tried, convicted, and incarcerated
were brand new laws in 1917 or 1918. These laws were enacted largely due to the fact that so
much of the populace had been adamantly against American involvement in the conflict.
The intrusion of federal law enforcement into the lives of rural southern people, and the
quick and gleeful compliance of everybody’s neighbors spying for the state, must have been
startling, but from a historical perspective, this intrusion should not necessarily be surprising.
Michele Foucault argued in his book, Discipline and Punish, that the effect of heightened
surveillance upon a society can lead to “panopticism,” or the idea that totalizing surveillance
disciplines the population under observation, leading them to comply with the demands of those
in authority. The panopticon was an invention of Jeremy Bentham, which allowed a jailer inside
a correctional institution to view all prisoners simultaneously without being seen by them. Since
prisoners could not know when they were being individually watched and when they were not,
the panopticon ensured compliance with prison regulations. According to Foucault, "He who is
subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of
power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own
subjection."71 Americans during the war did simultaneously play both roles, both upon
themselves, and upon their neighbors. Discourses of “100% Americanism,” along with the
propaganda meted out by George Creel’s Committee on Public Information, created a social
environment where people felt they were under surveillance at all times, and therefore, not only
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disciplined themselves to obey the government’s new wartime laws, but to turn on their
neighbors as well. This discipline created “the carceral state.” The discourses that Creel’s
committee generated and helped to disseminate were just as totalizing as the eventual
surveillance that they helped to achieve. Creel, in a book that he wrote after the war in order to
make sure that the Committee on Public Information did not disappear into obscurity, wrote:
Many a good and mis-informed citizen, who had an unformed but vivid impression that the "Creel
Committee" was some iniquity of the devil, took with his breakfast a daily diet of our material from the
same journal that had given him this impression, met us again at lunch when his children came home with
what the teacher had given them from material we prepared, heard us again through our Four Minute Men
organization when he went to the "movies," where our films might be part of the program, and rose to local
prominence by the speeches he drew from the pamphlets of that other useful organization, the Committee on
Public Information. Like the truant boy who ran away from the schoolmaster, Hugh Toil, he found us,
recognized and unrecognized, at every turn of the road.72

Just as the Creel Committee’s propaganda found the good citizen at every turn, so too would the
hegemonic lens of the carceral state. Creel claimed that due to the work of the committee,
“Never was a country so thoroughly contra-espionaged ! Not a pin dropped in the home of any
one with a foreign name but that it rang like thunder on the inner ear of some listening sleuth!”73
Soon, Arthur Dunham and his colleagues would learn just how true this was.
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Chapter Two: Citizenship and Duty: Arthur Dunham Meets the Carceral
State
As the events that would drag the U.S. into the World War unfolded, Arthur Dunham
went to a movie “with a friend” on New Year’s Day, 1917. This friend would later become his
wife. The movie they watched that night was The Crisis, a novel adapted to film about the events
leading up to the American Civil War. Dunham and his “friend,” Esther Francis Schneider (who
was a religious pacifist), saw, among other things, “a remarkably vivid battle scene, with handto-hand fighting,--war in its raw, brutal reality.” Dunham found that the film turned his mind
towards the possibility of America entering the war against Germany, and stated in his memoirs
that “We left the picture sobered.”74 Dunham began to think more and more about the possibility
of the U.S. entering the war. Esther, who was well educated and who had spent much time
reading and thinking about the morality of war, needled him. When Congress declared war in
April of 1917, Dunham “believed that America’s entrance into the War [sic] was morally
unjustifiable.”75 Dunham had come to believe “in the principle of Love as the motive for every
individual act and every group relationship. . . Now the war suddenly challenged this principle.
Americans were to be sent out to mangle and slaughter Germans.” The U.S., which believed
itself to be a Christian nation, had decided to reject “the principle of love and the brotherhood of
man” when it came to Germany, and therefore, Dunham felt forced to reject the war as grossly
immoral and unchristian.76
His mind quickly turned to conscription: if he thought the war was morally wrong, what
should he do if he were drafted? Dunham had always considered himself more patriotic than
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most, and felt concerned that he owed a duty of citizenship to his nation. He asked Esther her
opinion, and she replied, “What of your duty to God?”77 Esther’s question convinced Dunham to
think long and hard about his relationship to the draft. Doing so, he quickly found that it “was the
turning point” in his thoughts on the war. Esther’s question not only made him rethink the draft,
but it proved to be “a question that challenged the fundamental basis” of his beliefs.78 Arthur
came to believe that “Either the war was wrong or my Christianity was worthless,” and he set out
to embrace the Kingdom of God as his highest allegiance.79 He wrote to a friend that:
I have decided about conscription. Unless I believe that the situation has materially changed, or unless I see
my duty differently than at present, I will not submit to being drafted for service in this War….. When the
principle of Nationality arrays itself against the principle of Love and its expression in Universal
Brotherhood, I can not hesitate to place my religion, my allegiance, to God, before even my allegiance to
my country.80

Dunham had been raised a Christian, but the war and the draft made him into a sectarian that
would choose the values of the Kingdom of God over the dominant values of America culture.
Many people in the United States opposed American entrance into the war on a variety of
grounds, including an interest in maintaining isolationism, their reverence for the Monroe
Doctrine, a belief that the causes of the war in Europe did not rise to the occasion of war, the
potential cost of the war, the value of maintaining neutral while providing an example to Europe,
a rejection of state violence, and other reasons. Dunham, however, rejected the war purely for
religious reasons: he believed that all relations should emanate from the motive of love, and war
simply did not, and could not, be a loving action.
While Dunham rejected the conflict because he believed it violated the principle of love,
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other COs who ended up at Leavenworth rejected the war for other reasons. Examining the lives
and paths that led other COs, such as Evan Thomas and Harold Gray, to Leavenworth, can shed
light on the various reasons why sectarians rejected the great war and refused to fight.
While Arthur Dunham wrestled with his convictions regarding war and peace in the first
months of 1917, Evan Thomas, the brother of Norman Thomas (who would run for President on
the Socialist ticket six consecutive times starting in 1928), declared his pacifism two years
before, in November of 1915.81 Before the outbreak of the war, Thomas had been a seminary
student at Union Theological Seminary in New York. More interested in social work than church
work, he viewed the war as a great social tragedy, and determined to get as close to the action as
possible. He quit Union, and moved to Edinburgh, Scotland to continue his theological studies.82
While there, Thomas read the works of Leo Tolstoy, the famous Russian pacifist and mystic,
which heavily impacted his thinking about theology, as well as violence.
However, he also had contact with many people who had brothers at the front, and what
he heard about military life disturbed him. Thomas was also appalled at the massive loss of life,
and the sheer incompetence of British military officers who led their soldiers in charges across
No-Man’s Land for no appreciable military gain.83 In a letter to Norman, Evan Thomas decried
the fact that those who entered the army had to give up their freedom to speak openly and
critically about the war and their government’s military policy. Thomas was greatly disturbed by
the fact that military life required unthinking compliance to the will of others. Evan Thomas
queried Norman Thomas, “There is no right or wrong – simply obedience to military orders.

81

Evan Thomas to Norman Thomas, November 1, 1915, quoted in Charles Chatfield, ed. The Radical “No”: The
Correspondence and Writings of Evan Thomas on War (New York: Garland Pub., 1974), 27-28.

82

Chatfield, 19.

83

Ibid, 31.

30
May I ask, has any individual the right to give up his individuality so completely? Has the
Christian the right to compromise with or blaspheme in this way the holy spirit within him?”84
Thomas argued that if the nations of Europe were Christian, they could not have engaged
in war against each other, because “Jesus was a non-resistant absolutely, when it came to the
point of self-defense or actually injuring another person. He may have taken a whip of cords and
driven out a bunch of grafters, but he didn’t do it with guns.”85 Instead, Thomas proposed a
counter-factual scenario, arguing that if France and Britain had not resisted Germany, that the
allied countries would not have been destroyed by Germany, and that such an action would have
“done much towards breaking down a narrow nationalism which is a curse to civilization as well
as Christianity.”86 Thomas felt that he must not simply argue against war, but attempt to do good
in the midst of so much evil. He quit his studies in Edinburgh, and volunteered with the
Y.M.C.A. to act as a youth secretary to German POWs in the south of England. His decision to
work with POWs, as will be seen, would make a greater impact than he supposed.87
Thomas’ objection to war and to military service was larger than a rejection of violence,
however. It was a rejection of what Capozzola argues was a well-known set of political
obligations that citizenship brings with it. Thomas’ embrace of non-resistance was also an
embrace of sectarianism. It was, in other words, a rejection of the values of the dominant culture,
and a rejection of the responsibilities that the national culture imposed upon its citizens. Thomas
formulated this new worldview, his new-found responsibilities to the Kingdom of God—which
required a rejection of his responsibilities to the nation-state—in Scotland, during a period when
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the United States was not at war, and when he believed the nation would stay out of the conflict.
However, he would find soon enough that his new-found commitments would be put to the test.
Thomas did not keep his views on war and peace to himself. He would befriend Harold
Studley Gray, who, along with Arthur Dunham, would later become his colleague in a CO
barracks, and then in prison at Fort Leavenworth. Gray—the son of Phillip Gray, Henry Ford’s
general counsel at the Ford Motor Company in Detroit, Michigan—was a student at Harvard
when the war broke out. Gray, like Dunham, was quite patriotic, and when the conflagration
broke out in Europe in 1914, he joined a “preparedness corps” at Harvard that would prepare him
to be an officer in case the U.S. entered the conflict.88 Harold’s father urged him not to join
either the preparedness corps or the military, as he felt that Harold was meant for better things.
Phillip’s attitude would change, however, when conscription began in 1917.89
Before war came to the U.S., however, Gray, who was the president of the Young Men’s
Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) at Harvard (his father was on the board of the International
Y.M.C.A.90), was approached by Y.M.C.A. officials with the possibility of spending a year
abroad in England working with German POWs. Seeking and finding the approval of his
father—who was assured by Y.M.C.A. officials that the experience would be transformative for
his son—Gray quit school and traveled to England to spread the gospel to the Germans.91 Gray’s
experience in England, however, transformed him in ways that he and Phillip never imagined.
Gray—in close company with his friend and fellow Disciple of Christ Kirby Page, Presbyterian
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Evan Thomas, and social gospeller Sherwood Eddy—began to question whether a Christian
could participate in warfare.92 He was troubled by his experiences with German POWs and their
treatment by the British, as well as the morality of whether it was permissible for a Christian to
kill. In the POW camp, Gray engaged in drawn out arguments with Page, Thomas, and Eddy
and, at one point, joined a formal debate on war, arguing the side of the conscientious objector as
part of an academic exercise. Those arguments and debate, coupled with his experience with the
German POWs and his interaction with British soldiers, had a lasting impact on Gray’s thought.
In November of 1916, Gray declared himself a pacifist, and by January of 1917, he decided he
wanted to return to the United States.93 A month later, Gray told his mother that he absolutely
would not accept conscription: “For my part I am a conscientious objector from the word go.
They can shoot me if they like but they won't make me fight,” he told her.94
When America declared war on Germany in April of 1917, Gray, Thomas, Page, and
Sherwood Eddy, all of whom were Y.M.C.A. secretaries in Britain, decided that they could no
longer work with German POWs while the rest of the country geared up for war. Kirby and
Sherwood Eddy, both ordained ministers and therefore exempt from the draft, decided to proceed
to China to engage in missionary work. Thomas and Gray, however, neither of whom were
ministers, and therefore, both subject to conscription, each decided that conscience required that
they head back to the United States so that they might take a stand against both the requirements
of citizenship and against the war itself.95 Thomas proceeded home first, while Gray stayed in
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England for several more months before booking passage back to the United States.
While Harold Gray, Evan Thomas, and their ordained friends debated war in England,
Arthur Dunham was working on his degree in St. Louis. When the federal government instituted
the draft, Dunham appeared before his draft board—and in fact, a relative served as the board’s
registrar—and registered for the draft, claiming exemption based upon being a conscientious
objector. Dunham told his relative that he believed that the Constitution’s First Amendment
protections of religion should protect him from the draft, which was duly noted on his draft card.
Dunham, however, was fortunate in that his registration number was drawn fairly late in the draft
lottery, and therefore, he was not immediately called up for military service.96
But while Dunham had embraced sectarian beliefs, especially pacifism and the conviction
that the country should not enter the war, he was still a member of the Presbyterian church.
During the summer of 1917, Dunham worked as an itinerant minister in Illinois, preaching at a
church that lacked a settled pastor. Near the end of his term, Dunham felt convicted to preach on
the war, and he presented “the pacifist point of view as strongly as” he could.97 Other than one
member, who Dunham characterized as a former “federal office holder” walking out during his
sermon, the congregation took his sermon in stride. In November, Dunham was asked to preach
several times in a Presbyterian church in St. Louis, where he had “previously worked and was
well known.” He preached his anti-war sermon again at this congregation, but unlike his
experience in Illinois, he experienced significant resistance. The congregational session
summoned Dunham, demanding he appear before the full church and to “retract the ‘disloyal’
and objectionable comments” he had made. Dunham not only refused, but he challenged the
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session to report him to the government for violation of the Espionage Act, if they felt he had
done so.98 Much like Harold Gray and Evan Thomas, Arthur Dunham was not only willing to
challenge the war, but to challenge the government behind it. Luckily for Dunham, the session
was unwilling to file a complaint with the government, but they did inform him that he would
likely be excluded from fellowship from the congregation for his anti-war stance.99
Dunham had no more difficulties until the Spring of 1918, when the draft board
summoned him for a physical examination and to fill out a questionnaire. Dunham stated in his
memoirs that he did not place any anti-war statements on the questionnaire, nor did he ask for
CO status on the form, because, according to the Selective Service Act, he did not qualify for CO
status because, as a member of the Presbyterian Church, he did not belong to any of the “wellrecognized sects opposed to war.” At the same time, Dunham applied for a “letter of dismissal”
from his church in St. Louis, which refused his request, but which also “dropped [him] from the
roll.” Dunham’s break from the Presbyterian Church was complete. He was a sectarian, but not a
member of a sectarian religious group.100 Dunham “then applied to the Friends’ Reconstruction
Unit in France,” because he felt that he should serve his country during the war. His application,
however, was denied. In the months that followed, Dunham struggled with whether or not he
should accept some sort of non-combatant status, or if he should declare himself an absolutist.101
In May of 1918, Dunham traveled to a social work conference in Kansas City, where he spoke
with a representative from the National Civil Liberties Bureau (later the American Civil Liberties
Union, or ACLU). Dunham queried his contact about service as a medic or other non-combatant.
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While the NCLB worker was reluctant to advise Dunham (likely because of the passage of the
Sedition Act which had occurred that month), he told Dunham that if he himself were drafted, he
would most likely refuse both non-combatant as well as “compulsory civilian service” as well.
Dunham meditated on this advice, and finally determined that he would refuse any and all
service to the government because to do so could aid the overall war effort, even indirectly.102
Dunham still struggled with his conception of owed service, however. At the beginning
of June 1918, the government announced a farm furlough program, which seemed to him to be
“eminently fair.” Esther—now Dunham’s fiancée—advised him that she had heard that many
absolutists were even rejecting farm furlough offers. Dunham marveled at this revelation,
wondering how absolutists could justify refusing even to work on a farm during the conflict.103
On June 27th, Dunham’s local draft board informed him that his number would be called,
and that he would be sent to Jefferson Barracks for in-processing. A few days later, he received a
summons ordering him to report to his draft board on July 8th in order to be inducted into the
United States Army.104 Dunham, intending to be courteous, sent a letter to the barracks
commander, informing him of his decision to be a conscientious objector, stating:
I am not a Quaker, but my views regarding war are similar to those of the Quakers. I believe that all war is
unjustifiable, unnecessary, and wrong; because I believe that it is a violation of Christianity and
Christianity’s law of Universal Love. I hold this belief, not because it is the creed of any church, but
because I am led to it by the reason and conscience which God has given me and because it is a part of my
own personal religion. I have the highest respect and admiration for those who go into this war to fight for
their own convictions; but I can seek only to be equally true to my own ideas of what is right. . . As a loyal
citizen of the United States, I have obeyed the Government as far as I can. . . Faithfulness to my conscience
and my religious convictions makes it impossible for me to accept military service. I feel that I can not
accept even the ‘non-combatant’ service in the Medical Corps, since the Medical Corps is an integral part
of the Army and is an essential factor in the prosecution of the war. At the same time, I am anxious to
render what ever service I can in accordance with my conscience and my religious convictions. . . I should
gladly undertake the Friends’ Unit Work for the duration of the war, and if, pending the final determination
of my status, some arrangement might be made whereby I could perform any service consistent with my
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religious convictions, I should gladly give my best efforts to such service.105

Dunham declared his sectarian stance to the government, stating exactly what he was willing and
not willing to do, and then prepared for the worst.
Dunham reported to his local draft board at 9am on Monday, July 8th, wearing “the oldest
clothes that” he owned, and expecting to be arrested.106 To Dunham’s surprise, no one was
particularly interested in him. The next day, he looked for an opportunity to make his stance
known, and he declared his CO stance to a private who had asked him to sign his “service
record.” Dunham refused, voicing his reasons, and was surprised when the private told him, “I
don’t know anything about it.” The private left and returned with a sergeant, who called him “a
damned coward!” Dunham disagreed, and the Sergeant asked him, “How would you like about
five years in the penitentiary?” Dunham replied, “I am ready for that if that is the penalty.”107
The Sergeant, after barking a few more insults at Dunham, took him before a First Sergeant, who
more politely inquired if Dunham was sure about his stance, and who then took him to a medical
officer, who ordered that Dunham be sent to headquarters. Upon his arrival there, he was
directed to a Sergeant Major, and then the Captain of the Post, to whom Dunham had written his
letter. The Captain quietly questioned him on his stance, and then asked if he would accept noncombatant service. Dunham declined, and the Captain explained that the service record was not
an acceptance of military service, but instead, argued that the service was “thrust upon you!”
Dunham replied that it was “wished upon him,” which angered the Captain. He told Dunham that
his stance would most likely be investigated by a Major, and then he would be sent to Fort
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Leavenworth.108 Dunham signed the card, and then he passed through a number of offices and
under the power of a number of soldiers, all of whom inquired about his lack of a uniform.
Dunham had several soldiers argue with him, but at least one private told Dunham he understood
his position. In the insurance office, Dunham had his first encounter with what he called “the
question,” which was, “If some ruffian insulted or tried to rape your wife, what would you do?”
Dunham told the inquirer that he would “Probably punch in him the jaw and knock him out, but I
don’t think that’s an analogy to an organized army going out to murder!”109 Dunham would later
state that he could tell much about a man by how far he pushed “the question.”110
On Thursday, July 11th, he returned to headquarters and was formally deposed in a
courtroom by “the major,” who had his answers recorded by a court reporter. He asked Dunham
to explain his objections at length, and also asked many questions about his membership in the
Fellowship of Reconciliation, a peace organization founded at the beginning of the war in
Europe. The major told Dunham that he would be held on base until his case was adjudicated,
and Dunham then volunteered to work in the Y.M.C.A.’s library, assisting the “muchoverworked Librarian.”111 Dunham’s request demonstrated that he was not against working, only
against anything that might actually contribute to the war effort.
The next day, Dunham was assigned to a new tent, while the rest of his cohort was sent to
Texas for basic training. Later that morning, a corporal advised Dunham that he and another CO,
William Pardue, would be taken to the base hospital to receive a mental health examination.
When Dunham met Pardue, he found that he was a preacher for the International Bible Students
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Association (IBSA), which would later be known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Both Dunham and
Pardue passed their examinations, and Pardue was quite excited because the doctor found
Russell’s teachings on war “very convincing.”112
No one in the Army could be troubled with Dunham’s request to work in the library, so
Dunham assigned himself to this task and began working for the Y.M.C.A.113 He found himself
living in a tent of new recruits, and after discussing his CO stand with a graduate of the
University of Kansas, his tent mate exclaimed, “Well, doggone it, I was going to be one [a
conscientious objector], too, but I lost my nerve!”114 This would not be Dunham’s last time
talking to soldiers who had planned to be conscientious objectors but who had not been able to
declare their objection when the time came.
On July 20th, Dunham and Leroy Willard, an IBSA member, were dispatched to
Leavenworth.115 Dunham believed that his travelling companion would receive a farm furlough,
since the IBSA was known for its anti-war stance. Dunham and Willard arrived at Leavenworth
on Sunday morning, July 21st. They were immediately escorted to the CO barracks, a “threestory brick building, closely hedged in by a barbed wire enclosure.”116 Dunham immediately
encountered Roger Baldwin, the director of the NCLB, who was conferring with the COs.
Shortly after Dunham and Willard arrived, someone produced an organette, and a worship
service began. Along with music and prayers, a discussion of Jesus’ beatitudes occurred.
Dunham’s associates were a ragtag bunch, some educated, others not. He encountered “Jewish

112

Ibid, 24-26.

113

Ibid, 26.

114

Ibid, 27.

115

Ibid, 28.

116

Ibid, 29-30.

39
boys from New York, bearded young Mennonite farmers from Kansas, men who looked and
spoke like foreigners, and even a few men in uniform – why, no one seemed to know or ask.”117
After worship, Dunham had his first encounter with Evan Thomas. Thomas presided over
a meeting of the COs, where they discussed whether or not the COs should work as Kitchen
Police (KP), as well as the other work required around the CO barracks. Dunham reported that
“about 18 men objected to this work because the serving included the officer and non-coms as
well as C.O.’s.”118 Dunham reported that the men would ask the Captain if they could make their
own assignments of work, which would free the work from the connotation that the Army was
making the assignments. The men voted, and asked that the men with objections to KP work be
exempted from the work, and everyone else would fill in.119
Dunham found that he was surrounded with “more shades of C.O.’s than” he had ever
imagined. Dunham learned that the Board of Inquiry was “granting furlough’s rather liberally,”
but that many men who were granted farm furloughs or Friend’s Service furloughs—which
Dunham had sought—were ready to reject them. Many of the men “were ready to fight to the last
ditch against the whole principle of conscription.” 120 Roger Baldwin told the men that if they
refused furloughs, they would be sentenced to prison in the Disciplinary Barracks of the Fort,
and that if they refused to work, they would be put in solitary confinement. Another CO,
“Henry,” who Dunham described as “a young Jewish fellow with a mane of black hair,” declared
that he would rather be shot than face solitary confinement again. He had experienced solitary
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confinement at Fort Hamilton, and could not bear the prospect of experiencing it again.121
Conversation turned to the operation of the Board of Inquiry, and one young man
complained to Dunham that he felt that he had been wrongfully categorized as a “Class Two”
objector—someone who was sincerely opposed to combatant service, but insincere in their
opposition to noncombatant service—because he was a Catholic, and the Catholic Church in the
United States had supported the war. Another man, who was designated as a “Class Three”
objector—someone who was totally insincere in their objection—believed it was because he had
become flustered at a series of technical questions regarding his ethics.122 Many of the COs were
interested in the make-up of the three-member board. It was said that Judge Julian W. Mack, a
justice on the U.S. Court of Appeals, was Jewish, and understood the sectarian radicalism of
many of the Jewish COs. Harlan F. Stone, the Dean of the Columbia University Law School, was
more well acquainted with sectarian Christian COs. The third member, Major Richard C.
Stoddard, represented the Army in the proceedings, and was known for being fairly quiet.123
After talking with his fellow COs about the Board of Inquiry, Dunham took stock of the
rest of his surroundings. He discovered five ISBA members holding a worship service on the
second floor of the barracks, and then had a conversation about religion with “William,” a
member of the Plymouth Brethren, one of the historic, institutionalized peace sects. William
declared that Dunham was “just a poor lost sinner on the way to hell!” William told Dunham that
neither his college education, nor his good works would save him. In talking with other COs,
Dunham found that many of them were “intensely conservative in their theology, though some of
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them were sharply antagonistic to the organized churches.”124
The next day, Dunham went hiking with several other COs, but before he left, another
CO, who refused to go on the hike, quoted 1 Timothy 4:8 and told Dunham that “bodily exercise
profiteth little.” This CO, Luther, had spent 30 days in prison before being drafted for his vocal
opposition to the war. Dunham tried to argue with him, but found it was difficult to argue with
someone with a ready barrage of proof-texts to toss out for every counterpoint.125
Later that night, Dunham wandered into a meeting of the “intellectuals,” as they were
known, which included Evan Thomas and Harold Studley Gray. The men were involved in an
intense argument surrounding whether or not the COs ought to partake in KP duty, whether they
should follow orders to put up and take down tents which were used by the COs, whether they
should assist in cleaning up the barracks, as well as “the importance of Conscription as an issue.”
The men also discussed when a CO should “assume an ‘absolutist’ position of refusing to do any
work under military direction.”126 Evan Thomas, for his part, rather disliked men drawing “fine
distinctions” over what work they were and were not willing to do. Thomas longed for a “big
issue” to oppose. Soon enough, he and the others would find one, and face the consequences for
making a stand.
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Chapter Three: Segregation in Camp Riley, Prison at Fort Leavenworth
On Thursday, July 25, 1918, the army ordered Dunham and his compatriots to clean their
barracks thoroughly. They then boarded a Union Pacific train, headed to Fort Riley, Kansas,
about five hours away.127 When they arrived, Dunham found himself placing his cot on a
sleeping porch along with Evan Thomas, Harold Gray, and several “Jewish Socialists.” Shortly
after they arrived, Evan Thomas called the group together to discuss KP duty and the cleaning of
the barracks. Thomas felt that the division of duties as they had been assigned at Leavenworth
had not worked well, and he asked the men to vote on various options for dealing with them at
Camp Riley. Dunham reported that out of about one hundred men present, only twenty-five
voted. The fact that seventy five percent of the men were unwilling to cast a vote frustrated
Thomas, and he “resigned from his informal ‘chairmanship,’ saying that this was a
demonstration that it was useless for us to try to organize and that probably organization among
us was undesirable – because of our varying positions we should leave everything to the
individual.”128 That the vast majority of the men refused to vote is telling and demonstrative of a
sectarian and even anarchistic impulse among many of the objectors. Just as sectarians are
opposed to the dominant values of the culture, many are also opposed to traditional standards of
government, especially those that they feel are not completely voluntary. For example, among
the Churches of Christ, the largest of the peace sects during the war, most members embraced a
complete rejection of participation in any type of organization outside the local church, including
all levels of government.129 Therefore, it is unsurprising that many of the men were unwilling to

127

Dunham, 39.

128

Ibid, 41.

129

For a full theological explication of this type of view, see David Lipscomb, On Civil Government: Its Origin,
Mission, and Destiny, and the Christian's Relation to It (Indianapolis.: Doulos Christou Press, 2006).

43
participate in such a meeting, even as it was disconcerting to a man like Evan Thomas, who had
arrived at a sectarian position, but one which was opposed to anarchy.
Later that day, shortly after Thomas renounced his ‘chairmanship’ of the COs, he, Harold
Gray, and Howard Moore met and decided that they would take a stand as absolutists. They
decided that their ‘big issue’ which Thomas had so longed for, would be the immorality of
conscription. They decided their position would be that of “refusing to do any work under
military direction or while they were held by the military under conscription.” Harold Gray
proclaimed that, “At last, we have no more of these fine lines to draw, -- no more of this
continuous round of maddening decisions on little picayunish issues!”130
Shortly after this meeting, the men were assembled for the first of four times during that
day, and each time the army asked for volunteers to work. The first request was for farm work.
Leroy Willard, the ISBA preacher, volunteered, along with nine other men. Dunham and many
others felt that these requests were “an effort to draw us into virtual temporary non-combatant
service.” Later that day, they were asked to erect tents, to pull weeds, and to move a mess hall to
where they were encamped. Dunham asked if the building would be temporary or permanent,
and an officer told him that it would be temporary. He and about twenty-five others decided to
volunteer to move the mess hall. However, Dunham and his friend Roderick later felt that the
army had duped them. The “temporary” mess hall was two wooden barracks, which the men had
to deconstruct, move several miles, and reconstruct near their barracks as one building. Dunham
and Roderick, because of this abuse, turned down other volunteer opportunities to work.131
A few days later, an officer assembled the men together and took them to an area with no
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other buildings, but which held finished lumber. The officer in charge of the detail directed the
men to break up into groups of eight who would live together in a tent, and to grab materials and
assemble their own tent. Dunham, along with Evan Thomas, Harold Gray, Roderick, and several
other COs decided to bunk together. However, out of the eight men, only three, included
Dunham, Roderick, and a man named Harry, were not absolutists. Therefore, Dunham, Roderick,
and Harry—along with Erling Lunde, who was not part of the group—erected the tent without
the help of the other COs who would live in the tent.132
Later that evening, an officer assembled the men and asked for volunteers for KP. About
half the group stepped forward, including Dunham and one of his tent-mates, Theodore. Those
that did not volunteer were ordered by an officer to move to a “barren field” down the way.
Theodore and Dunham both decided to join the absolutists and face the punishment with those
COs who refused. Dunham refused the work because he believed that the army was trying to
obtain as much work as it could from COs, that working would require him “to draw more fine
lines than ever on all sorts of petty issues,” and because he was opposed to the fact that those
who did not volunteer would face “punitive treatment.” Dunham believed that such punishment
was contrary to the orders of the Secretary of War for the treatment of COs, and so he would
rather face this unlawful punishment than work while his comrades faced just injustice.133
The officer marched them down to the field, where a tent-camp was waiting for them,
and he advised them that they would be issued raw rations. They were told that “these rations
must be cooked individually over open-fires,” and that they would “have to build a latrine” for
themselves as there was not one there for their use. The men refused to build the latrine. Dunham
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stated that the men came to believe that the Army was acting in bad faith, and that they must
have ulterior motives in requiring them to do such work. Furthermore, the men believed that
being issued raw rations was also punishment, and the majority of the men refused to draw
rations. On Sunday, Evan Thomas, Harold Grey, and Howard Moore began a hunger strike,
refusing to eat as long as the army refused to furnish cooked rations. The rest of the men—
including Arthur Dunham—finished eating the food that they had with them, and then joined in
the hunger strike of the absolutists on Tuesday.134
The Colonel in charge granted several men permission to leave the camp to go to town to
eat in an attempt to break the strike. The men did not eat, but they did go to town to forward a
letter to the War Department, complaining of the conditions, including the requirement to build
their own latrine and cook their own food. Dunham took the opportunity to mail an uncensored
letter, which indicated that the Colonel had threatened several of the men with court-martial if
they were “defiant” or spread propaganda. Two days later, the men were assembled by two
officers in order to talk about the hunger strike. The officers offered to provide food to the fifty
or so men who were refusing to cook individually, and the group would be allowed to cook
communally if they so chose. The Army also offered to provide kitchen supplies, so that the men
would not have to cook on an open fire, as well as utensils. Most of the men were amenable to
this arrangement, but the absolutists refused to cook food for themselves. Several of the men
agreed to cook for everyone, including the absolutists, which then ended the strike.135 But this
compromise, which put the cooking fully under the control of the COs, only temporarily solved
the problem. The men would soon learn that the Army would only indulge them so much.
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While the cooking situation was fixed, the issue of the latrine took more time. The men
continued to refuse to build their own bathroom facilities, and so one of the officers designated a
space to be used temporarily. This, of course, was not satisfactory to the men. Some of the more
persistent COs obtained permission from an officer to visit the regular barracks to use the latrine.
Dunham stated in his memoirs that the days that the COs were without a permanent latrine were
“three of the hottest July days that” he had ever experienced. Shortly thereafter, the entire group
was given permission to use the regular barracks latrines, but the men were harassed by the
soldiers there. On August 23rd, the COs who had refused to partake in KP work were finally
given their own latrines, which were constructed by COs who had volunteered to work.136
Besides the kitchen and the latrine, there were, of course, the tents. The men bunked with
friends who shared similar views to themselves. The COs began naming their tents, and Dunham
reported that among these were “Camp Bolshevki,” which held several Russians, the
“International Tent,” which held several Jews as well as other foreigners who were socialists.
The “Religious Tent” held “intensely religious and, with two exceptions, ultra-orthodox men,”
which included a Swedish Baptist, a Quaker, a Russian mystic, and a man who Dunham called a
“deeply religious… agnostic.”137 A few days later, more men joined the camp, including a large
group of “small-sect” men, as Dunham called them, including many Mennonites and Molokans,
old order Russian Orthodox who refused to fight in the war.138
An “unfortunate misunderstanding,” between the COs who were cooking and the
absolutists, occurred on August 17th. One of the absolutists severely criticized a cook and the KP
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crew, and the entire volunteer staff resigned en masse. To solve this problem, the Army began
issuing uncooked rations to all COs. However, as before, many of the absolutists refused to
accept them. On August 20th, Howard Moore declared that he would begin a hunger-strike. Evan
Thomas, Harold Gray, and Erling Lunde all joined Howard in his strike, calling for an end to
conscription. Thus began one of the most famous incidents in the history of conscientious
objection during the war. Eventually, the four were taken to the base hospital, and doctors began
force feeding them through a hose. After several days of this, all of the men gave up the strike,
with Howard Moore being both the first to begin and the last to give up the strike.139 This strike
of a few COs would end up bringing severe consequences for the rest of the company.
On September 16th, the company was addressed by a Colonel, who offered the men noncombatant opportunities. None of the men stepped forward, and the colonel became angry and
accused the men of collusion. One of the COs told the Colonel that he saw no difference between
combatant and non-combatant service, and the colonel replied, “Never mind what you think. The
President of the United States is doing your thinking! He has decided this matter.”140 Such an
argument was of course wasted upon the men who disclaimed the state’s right to conscript their
service to the state. Near the end of the Colonel’s diatribe, two armed soldiers arrived, seeking to
arrest Evan Thomas. However, both Thomas and Harold Gray had violated orders and taken a
walk and were not present. Erling Lunde told an officer that he believed the soldiers were there
to arrest Thomas for his leadership in the hunger strike. Thomas and Gray returned to camp
several hours later, and Thomas was immediately arrested. The next day, another CO was

139
Ibid, 60-67. The story of the hunger strike has been covered by a number of historians. For an intimate and more
detailed description of the hunger strike, see Louisa Thomas, Conscience: Two Soldiers, Two Pacifists, One
Family (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 218-234.
140

Dunham, 69, 70.

48
arrested after it was found that he had gone into town without permission.141
Over the next three days, the Colonel assembled the men, and he offered non-combatant
status to the anyone who would accept it. He then ordered a group of men to fall out and clean up
the grounds, and men who refused were arrested. Over the three days, he had twenty-five men
arrested for refusing to follow orders. The Colonel ordered security to be tightened, and guards
were posted to keep men from leaving post. Over the next several days, men were increasingly
ordered to clean up the area outside of their immediate tent area. While most of the men had
complied with the orders to clean up around their own living area, many of them refused to clean
outside of this area, and they were also arrested. The army also increasingly subjected the men to
increased military discipline, required them to fall-in for reveille each morning, and required
them to hike while the rest of the soldiers on base were drilled. In order to clarify what they
would be willing to do, Harold Gray and Arthur Dunham wrote out statements stating their
positions. Gray’s statement made it clear that he opposed all conscripted work, but both would
agree to clean up after themselves and others in and around the tent camp.142
Harold Gray and Arthur Dunham were fortunate that they had not yet been arrested and
incarcerated in the Guard House. One of their colleagues, Herman Kaplan, a socialist, refused to
obey military orders of any sort once he was arrested. Tiring of his stand, the guards tortured
him. Charles Larsen, one of the COs in the Guard House, reported in his diary that:
Kaplan (after refusing work) was similarly questioned by the officer and likewise said that he could not
stand ‘attention’ nor do any work of a military nature. Thereupon, his arms were tied, a rope fastened
around his neck—the free end being thrown over a rod above and held by one of the guards. He was
ordered to stand ‘Attention’. Upon his refusal, his feet were kicked from under him by the Officer of the
Day and prison sergeant, and finally the latter took the free end of the rope from the guard and pulled it,
lifting Kaplan off his feet. When the latter’s eyes began to bulge and his tongue to stick out, he was let
down and asked if he would do some work. He again refused. The rope was then taken from his neck and
fastened around one arm, between his elbow and his shoulder. The rope was again pulled, and Kaplan lifted
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from the ground. The pain was intense, the arm was being forced out of joint and he emitted loud,
agonizing cries, imploring them to shoot him rather than torture him thus.143

The functionaries of the carceral state simply could not accept Kaplan’s and his fellow COs’
refusal to live up to what they believed were their citizenship obligations, and so they resorted to
extra-judicial violence to attempt to force compliance. These prison guards did so as agents of
the state, on behalf of the state, and the state was the intended beneficiary of their attempts to
obtain compliance with the new cultural norm of conscription. However, while these soldiers
acted under what appeared to be the color cover? of lawful authority, their actions were a clear
violation of their orders, and therefore, were military crimes under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
While Kaplan was being hung from his limbs and neck, other guards took a fire hose into
the cell block of the guard house and sprayed COs, to the point where several of them could
hardly breathe. Once the officers were done torturing Kaplan, they took Francis Hennessey and
Benjamin Berger, who they had sprayed with the fire hose, and commenced with hanging both of
them from the rope while demanding that they do some work around the guard house. Shortly
after the news of this torture reached the absolutist COs who had not yet been arrested, thirteen
of them suddenly opted for non-combatant service.144 The carceral state with its vigilante
violence and extra-legal policing had been successful in obtaining the compliance of some of
those who dared violate the social norms of conscription.
The threat of torture would not compel Arthur Dunham’s compliance with the carceral
state, however. On Saturday, September 28th, the men were assembled, and a lieutenant arrived
with a bundle of rakes that he then threw on the ground. The officer ordered a man to pick up a
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rake, which he did, but then the CO asked the lieutenant if he intended to have the man work,
and where. When the lieutenant told him that he would have to work wherever he was ordered,
he refused. The lieutenant then ordered each man in the company, including Dunham, to pick up
a rake. Dunham and most of the others refused, and they were arrested. Dunham and the others
were then marched to the Guard House, where they were incarcerated until their court-martial.
Out of thirty-seven men who were ordered to take the rake, only three complied.145
After being arrested, Dunham learned that some of the first men arrested by the Colonel
had gone on a hunger strike, and when they were released from the hospital, they were
transferred to the “Military Police Guard House at Camp Funston.” There, they were tortured
with cold showers, and the officers made the men scrub each other down with filthy toilet
brushes. One of the men refused, and he was thrown down onto the concrete floor and beaten.
His comrades reported that “When he recovered he became hysterical.”146 The Provost Martial at
Camp Funston, Colonel Barnes, beat some of the COs with a horse whip. Another CO was:
thrown to the wet ground, punched, kicked and spat at by the guard. He was raised to his feet and dragged
around some more. Presently he was dropped and one guard seized him by the hair and rubbed his face in
and banged his head on the group. His cheek and forehead were bruised, leaving two ugly skin wounds.
Then four guards carried him to the shower-room, stripped him of what little clothes remained on his
person, placed him on the cold cement floor, in an exhausted condition, and turned the cold spray upon
him. The soldiers then scrubbed him viciously with filthy brushes and brooms. One guard tickled his feet.
He was finally brought back to the squad-room in a semi-conscious state.147

This was just one incident in a series of abuses that became known as the “Funston Outrages.”
The treatment of COs at Funston was heavily publicized by peace organizations, the ACLU, and
the Friends of Conscientious Objectors, a voluntary organization that sought the release of COs
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from imprisonment. This publicity eventually led to both a military and a congressional
investigation, and several U.S. Army officers were fired, including Major Frank White, the Army
Judge Advocate for Camp Funston, who had presided over the trials of many COs.148
But while Arthur Dunham and some of his friends were spared from the worst abuses,
they were not spared from court-martial. On Saturday, October 19th, the Army ordered Evan
Thomas and two Molokans to pack, and transported them to Leavenworth where they were tried.
Dunham learned through a newspaper that they received life sentences at the Fort Leavenworth
Military Disciplinary Barracks. Thomas was convicted for refusing to eat during the second
hunger strike, and the Molokans for refusing to shovel trash. However, General Leonard Wood,
the commander of Funston, reduced their sentences to twenty-five years during his review. On
October 25th, Dunham received his indictment, showing that he was charged with violating the
64th article of war for refusing to pick up a rake. Dunham was informed by the private who
delivered his indictment that he could face the death penalty for his refusal to work.149
Dunham was court-martialed on November 12th, the day after Armistice Day. While the
war against Germany might have been over, the war against conscience was not, an irony not lost
on Dunham. Dunham pled not guilty, and he called several witnesses to testify. Much of the
testimony about Dunham’s conduct was contradictory, with one Lieutenant claiming that
Dunham had been defiant and completely unwilling to work, while other officers claimed that
Dunham had been pleasant, had worked around the camp, and had kept his area clean. Dunham
then made a statement regarding his objection to conscription, which can be summed up in his
opposition to war because of his adherence to Christianity. Dunham declared himself a “liberal”
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Christian, and informed the tribunal that he was no longer a member of any church as the
Presbyterian Church had supported the war effort. He then admitted to refusing to pick up the
rake, as he believed it was an order that was both unlawful and contradicted his conscience,
because he was being asked to clean an area of the camp that was outside of his immediate living
area. At that, the court-martial ended, and Dunham heard nothing until Thanksgiving Day, when
he was quickly ordered to pack up and leave. Dunham and five other COs, including Ray, who
had been a member of a dissenting sect of ISBA members, Ezra, a “Dunkard” member of the
Plymouth Brethren (a group that would split off from the Brethren in 1926), and another regular
member of the Plymouth Brethren, boarded a train headed for Fort Leavenworth.150
When Dunham and his colleagues arrived, they were greeted by several friends who had
arrived before them. Dunham learned that Evan Thomas was being held in solitary confinement
for protesting the bad treatment of several Molokans who were COs. Dunham’s friend Roderick
was also in solitary, as well. Dunham learned that about twenty-six men were in “the hole,” and
that several of his friends had been in solitary “for three or four weeks. . . receiving the treatment
outlined for recalcitrant soldier-criminals who refused to work: solitary confinement, bread and
water fourteen days at a time, and hand-cuffed to the bars of the cell nine hours a day.”151
However, Dunham would soon learn about solitary confinement first hand.
After reuniting with friends and becoming acquainted with the basics of prison life, the
“count” was called and then Dunham and the rest of the soldiers proceeded to bed at lights out.
Dunham woke when the lights came back on—to him, seemingly minutes after they went out.
Shortly after, a “room orderly” came by, and hit the bars with a broom, waking prisoners up.
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Dunham quickly came to distrust the orderlies, who were prisoners appointed by the guards to
keep an eye on others and to maintain discipline. Dunham believed that the “room orderlies were
often more brutal than the guards. . . The room orderly proceeded to use the methods which were
used throughout the prison, sharpened usually by bitterness over his own imprisonment.”152
Dunham found the room orderly position and their methods to be a logical expression of the
prison system. Indeed, it was, but it was also an excellent example of the carceral state at work.
While the army could only employ so many soldiers and officers as guards and wardens, it could
easily supplement this number by co-opting prisoners as spies and functionaries. These men
would attempt to keep order, and inform on those who would not submit. The Army found that it
could better police the prison by convincing soldiers to police themselves.
Dunham was informed once he arrived in the prison that he had been sentenced to
twenty-five years in prison. With good behavior, he could have eight years subtracted from his
sentence. However, Dunham believed that he would probably be released much earlier, and felt
instead that a sentence was “something of an index of the impression made upon the military by
the C.O.’s stand.” Evan Thomas had been sentenced to life imprisonment, and Harold Gray’s
prosecutor had asked for the death penalty for his insolence.153
Later that day, Dunham and several other new prisoners found themselves in the presence
of a lieutenant, the “Assistant Executive Officer” of the prison. He asked each prisoner what type
of work they did formerly, and what type of work they would like to do in the prison. Dunham,
along with most of the COs present, told the lieutenant that he could not conscientiously do any
work while at the prison. The lieutenant noted his response, but made no comment. The very
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next day, Dunham was ordered to work, and this time, he was ordered to pick up a broom instead
of a rake. He refused, and was ordered to stand along a wall. He was later taken to the Executive
Officer’s Office, where he again stated that he could not conscientiously work at the prison. He
was sentenced to two weeks in solitary confinement, and demoted from a first-class prisoner, to
third class. Because Dunham refused to break up rocks as work, the Army reduced his diet to
bread and water, and, he was handcuffed to the bars for nine hours a day as punishment.154
The cell was eight feet by five feet, and eight feet high, and made of brick and concrete.
It contained no furniture, except for a single wooden board that Dunham was expected to sleep
on. There was also a sink, a toilet, a dirty tin drinking cup, and three dirty blankets. The cell door
was boarded up, so Dunham could not see anything except for a small shaft of light that came
through on the top and bottom of the door. Dunham was not allowed to have any personal
belongings in the cell, including his bible. The conditions were awful and designed to obtain
compliance from the offender. Dunham stated in his memoirs that, “No doubt it is a mark of
immaturity of character, but I must confess that two or three times that week the conditions of
the solitary were so far psychologically effective as to produce the blackest fits of mental
depression that I have ever experienced. Personally, I always felt that this mental effect was the
most real torture of the Hole.”155
Dunham was able to yell to his fellows in the hole, and Dunham, Ted, and Jake, speaking
in French and German so as to be unintelligible to the guard, decided to work. Dunham
“recognized that in agreeing to work we were compromising the strict logic of our position,” but
they felt that the conditions, along with the fact that working in the prison did not assist in the
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war effort—especially since the war was over—warranted their compromise. The men also
worried that the conditions were destroying their health. Dunham would later come to believe
that he was wrong to compromise, stating “that it would have been braver, more logical, and
more consistent to have persisted in my refusal to work and to have remained in solitary. I regret
the weakness which caused me to compromise, and I doubly honor those who refused to
compromise.” Dunham told a guard that they would agree to work, as long as they were assigned
light tasks until they recovered from their stay in solitary. Dunham indicated that conditions
improved almost as soon as they informed the Army of their decision. Their cell doors were
suddenly left open, they were no longer handcuffed to the bars, and they received actual meals
on Sunday night and Monday.156
After some light work, Dunham was assigned duty on the “First Gang,” shoveling dirt
into wheelbarrows. After a couple of weeks on this work detail, Dunham was allowed to seek
other work, and he was assigned work as a messenger in the clerk’s office. He would carry
messages several times a day to other parts of the prison, but otherwise, would sit and read.157
On January 14th, a friend in the clerk’s office told Dunham that Evan Thomas was being
released. Dunham himself delivered the message ordering Thomas’ release, and Dunham was
present when Thomas arrived in his own clothes, carrying his suitcase. Thomas told Dunham that
he didn’t “want to go before the rest of you fellows. . . Tell the fellows I won’t forget them!”158
Upon Thomas’ release, he worked tirelessly for the freedom of his fellow COs, and with his
combined labor and that of others, they were finally successful on freeing all COs in custody.
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However, Dunham would not have to wait. On Wednesday, January 22nd, Dunham was at
work when the adjutant arrived and stated that he had orders to release 113 conscientious
objectors. Dunham found out the next day that he and Ted were on the list, and four days later,
they were free. Dunham was given discharge papers, and a check for $131.52 of back pay. He
and many conscientious objectors would later return this money. Twenty-four hours after
Dunham and Ted walked through the main gate, Arthur Dunham was home in St. Louis.159
But while Evan Thomas and Arthur Dunham were free, Harold Gray was not. Gray was
paroled to the Leavenworth Chicken Farm, but he quickly found that his parole included a
prohibition to speak about his pacifism. He requested to go back to Leavenworth, and was
returned and thrown in solitary confinement.160 On July 28, 1919, he was shipped with several
other COs to Alcatraz Prison in San Francisco. Gray would remain at Alcatraz until September
5th, 1919, when he was ordered released by Woodrow Wilson. Gray received a dishonorable
discharge, and sprawled across it was noted “Character: Bad.”161 Arthur Dunham, Evan Thomas,
and Harold Gray were finally all free.
A number of factors played a part in the final release of all conscientious objectors and
war resisters. The National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB), which was the legal division of the
American Union Against Militarism, was one of the largest organizations that worked for the
freedom of COs. Roger Baldwin—who Dunham had met upon his first arrival at Fort
Leavenworth—the head of the NCLB, had refused to comply with the Selective Service Act, and
spent six months in jail for his disobedience. The NCLB served as an information center for a
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variety of amnesty groups, and helped to fund legal aid work for COs and other war resisters.
The League for the Amnesty of Political Prisoners, founded by Emma Goldman and run mostly
by anarchists, worked to publicize the plight of federal and state prisoners who had been charged
with crimes under the Espionage and Sedition Acts. The group was initially run by Lucy Robins,
who eventually went to work for the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Robins sought to
mobilize the forces of the AFL, including its less radical elements, in order to bring political
pressure to bear on the government so that COs might receive amnesty. Robins contacted tens of
thousands of AFL locals, urging them to contact Washington about freeing COs. While many
more conservative locals refused, many complied, flooding the White House with amnesty
petitions.162
Pressure was not just brought to bear by outside groups, however. Theodore Lunde, the
father of Erling Lunde, one of the COs incarcerated with Dunham worked with Phillip Gray—
the father of Harold Gray—and Evan Thomas in order to rouse first family members of COs, and
then the public, to agitate for freedom for COs. Evan Thomas, who was released earlier than
Gray or Dunham, wrote letters to the President and the Department of War, seeking the release
of COs.163 However, while Evan was released early, President Wilson was opposed to the early
release of many political prisoners. It took continued political pressure and an amnesty
proclamation from the next President, Warren G. Harding, before all of America’s COs and war
resisters were finally freed.
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Chapter Four: The Dark Side of the Progressive Managerial (Carceral) State
The prison experiences of Arthur Dunham, Evan Thomas, Harold Gray, and other COs in
the First World War illuminate a number of issues that have been at the heart of this study. These
include questions surrounding sectarianism, the carceral state, and duties of citizenship, themes
bound up together and thus difficult to disentangle. In this final chapter, I will examine several
incidents in the lives of Dunham, Thomas, and Gray, and analyze how these questions were
asked and answered in their own experience of conscription and incarceration.
Although Dunham, Thomas, and Gray were not traditional sectarians, as none of them at
the time of their induction into the Army or their incarceration in CO barracks, the Guard House,
Fort Leavenworth or Alcatraz were members of sectarian religious groups, the men obviously
rejected traditional social values related to military service, duty to the state, and obedience to
laws that they objected to. So, too, did the more traditional sectarians who were members of
organized sectarian groups, as well as did other, non-religious conscientious objectors—such as
socialists and anarchists—who also indulged in a sectarian rejection of dominant culture values.
These men, at first glance, had little in common. The men that Dunham—a lapsed
Presbyterian—was surrounded by, came from all sorts of religious and secular backgrounds.
Among them were Baptists, Jews, Christadelphians, Methodists, Mennonites, Disciples of Christ,
independent Christians, Lutherans, Pentecostals, Old German Baptists, Hutterites, Wesleyans,
Moravians, Universalists, Molokan Russian Orthodox, members of the Seventh Day Adventists,
Plymouth Brethren, Dunkard Plymouth Brethren, Church of God, Holiness groups, the Society
of Friends, the Church of God and Saints of Christ, the ISBA (or Russellites), along with
humanists, socialists, and anarchists. But while these men all differed on the finer points of
theology, the vast majority of them agreed on one thing: that the dominant values of society,
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which included the use of violence, participation in war, and the conscription of their labor for
any purpose whatsoever that the state deemed necessary, were all values that they rejected, both
individually and in their respective communities.
Many of these men also rejected participation in human government or other
organizations outside of their own, if the members of the Church of Christ, Christadelphians,
ISBA, and Molokans, along with the 75% abstention rate from voting on CO issues, are any
indication. However, even though these men shared differing theological and social values, they
nonetheless made up one large sectarian congregation in the Guard House and in the
Penitentiary. These men, despite their differences, were thrown together via their shared values,
and relished their connections. Among Arthur Dunham’s papers are numerous sheets of scrap
paper, along with typed notes, indicating the names, addresses, and denominations of the men
that he shared his fate with. He also saved photographs of himself with different groups of the
men, and in some instances, he was kind enough to identify the men in these pictures. These
sectarians, brought together through their resistance to the use of their bodies in war, were truly
their own church. Considering that these men all believed in a true separation between church
and state, the irony that the state brought these men together into one group is palpable.
In addition to their shared anti-war, and in many cases, anti-government faith, these men
largely shared another characteristic: sectarians were typically of the working classes. Arthur
Dunham, Evan Thomas, and Harold Gray were anything but working class, and most of the
written sources that survive are from these three men. Of the three, however, Arthur Dunham
comes the closest. Unlike Thomas and Grey, Dunham was a social worker, and did not come
from a particularly rich or influential family. Later in life, Dunham would become a professor at
the University of Michigan—in their social work program—living not far from Harold Gray. But
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Dunham never obtained a doctorate, unlike Thomas, and was never independently wealthy, like
both Thomas and Gray. He was also unable to find a publisher for his memoirs, unlike both
Thomas and Gray. Therefore, while we might describe Dunham as middle class, he certainly was
not from the upper crust of society, and this may explain why his social contacts among the COs
in all of the locations that he was in was much wider than those of Thomas and Gray.
As mentioned in the introduction, Christopher Capozzola has argued that, in the years
before and during World War I, citizenship was understood to come with a set of well-known
social obligations. One common thread among the conscientious objectors that Dunham
encountered was the tension between their individual conscience and the pressure to adhere to
these social obligations. Dunham, in contemplating the possibility of conscription, asked his
girlfriend what he should do about his obligation to his community. Esther countered, “what of
your duty to God?”164 Dunham, through Esther’s suggestion, came to believe that he owed a
greater duty to the Prince of Peace than he did to the President of the United States. Likewise,
when Evan Thomas was wrestling with conscription, he described to his brother Norman what he
had heard from English soldiers about their duty to the crown, saying, “There is no right or
wrong – simply obedience to military orders. May I ask, has any individual the right to give up
his individuality so completely? Has the Christian the right to compromise with or blaspheme in
this way the holy spirit within him?”165 Thomas, as well, believed that Christianity placed a
greater duty on him than did his United States citizenship. Harold Gray may have had a harder
time wrestling with his conscience than either Thomas or Dunham. He joined the “Harvard
Regiment” shortly after the war broke out in Europe, in expressed opposition to his father, who
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thought that Gray was meant for better things than military service.166 Grey, of course, would
eventually leave the regiment, and fully reject war once he arrived in England, telling his mother,
“For my part I am a conscientious objector from the word go. They can shoot me if they like but
they won't make me fight.”167 Grey’s rejection of war came from both his experiences in dealing
with German POWs and his debates over the morality of warfare with his friends Evan Thomas,
Sherwood Eddy, and Kirby Page. But while Dunham, Thomas, and Gray were conscripted and
declared their conscientious objector status, none of them entered the Army as absolutists.
The pressure of the carceral state transformed the three—and many others—from simple
conscientious objectors into absolutists. While the written commands of Secretary of War
Newtown Baker towards COs were fairly mild, the implementation of these orders by noncommissioned officers, Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, and even flag-level officers were often
anything but. These soldiers took the refusal of COs to conform and obey personally. However,
their anger over the non-conformity of COs was much more than that. These soldiers and officers
were not offended simply because COs didn’t embrace the military, but because they believed
that these men were shirking their responsibilities to the nation.
While many educated, middle-class Americans shared many common values concerning
the obligations of citizens during the Progressive Era, Jennifer Keene has shown that
conscription was not one of them. The draft had never been universally implemented in America
before World War I, even during the Civil War, when it was used chiefly to keep soldiers in their
respective armies when their terms of enlistment came to an end. Therefore, conscription was not
a social obligation that Americans were used to when the United States entered the war in April
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of 1917. However, while it had not been part of this bundle of duties, it quickly became one with
the passage of the Selective Service of 1917 and the efforts of George Creel’s Committee for
Public Information. As is well known, the CPI dispatched “four-minute men” around the United
States in order to disseminate government propaganda throughout the United States. Very
quickly, war patriots denounced any “slacker” who refused to do his patriotic duty, whether that
duty be a social responsibility or a legal one.
But being called a slacker was the least pressure these men would face. From Dunham’s
experience of having a captain become angry with him for stating that his duty had been “wished
upon” him instead of “thrust upon” him, to a Colonel telling Dunham, Thomas, and Gray,
“Never mind what you think. The President of the United States is doing your thinking! He has
decided this matter,” this heavy pressure to conform pushed men that simply had scruples about
participating in warfare to reject any and all service under the draft. As sectarians, these men
were already highly skeptical of many of the dominant society’s values and were skeptical of
government as well. Being told that they were no longer allowed to do their own thinking
because the government had forcibly conscripted them against their will, then, practically invited
these men take a stand that would not only reject combatant status, but all non-combatant
statuses as well. In other words, the Army’s actions, instead of having the intended consequence,
resulted in sectarians rejecting all service out of spite, as well as out of conviction.
A rejection of simple negative social pressure was not the sole reason that Dunham chose
to reject all service. His experience with other COs, especially those who refused KP duty, and
seeing those COs punished for that refusal, pushed him over the edge from the simple rejection
of warfare to the rejection of most service under conscription. After seeing his fellow COs being
punished for failing to volunteer, he voluntarily chose to share their punishment. Such
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punishment for failing to volunteer lends much credence to Capozzola's contention that the U.S.
resorted to “coercive volunteerism” during the conflict.168 But it also significantly discredits
President Wilson’s contention that conscription was “in no sense the conscription of the
unwilling; it is, rather, selection from a nation which has volunteered in mass."169
Dunham had certainly not volunteered to be conscripted. He made it quite clear to the
military authorities from the very beginning that he was completely unwilling to render any type
of military service. However, he certainly volunteered to be punished for failing to volunteer.
Dunham, at least at first, was convinced that if the vast majority of American men were being
required to render service to the state, that he ought to render some sort of service as well.
Dunham was more than willing to provide overseas service through the Friends Reconstruction
Unit, or even through a farm furlough. The Army, however, decided that he ought to spend the
war in its service, wasting his time and his labor—if they could extract it—on projects around
various military facilities. While Dunham would, at least for a while, continue to submit to work
that would help to maintain him—specifically, cooking and cleaning around the area where he
lived—he firmly refused to engage in any other service after realizing that his fellows would be
punished for failing to volunteer. However, while punishment of COs was the tipping point for
Dunham, he had felt reluctant for some time about voluntarily engaging in work, especially after
he and several other COs had agreed to an army request to move a building they had been told
would be a “temporary” mess hall. Dunham and his friends concluded that the building would
actually be permanent, and thereafter decided to turn down other “voluntary” work assignments.
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According to Dunham, their service was not missed by the army.170 In other words, the only
value this work provided to the national war effort would be to bend the will of the conscientious
objectors, and confirm the authority of the state over their bodies in wartime.
However, such treatment does not fully explain why COs refused to cook their own food,
or to build their own latrine. The views of Dunham, Thomas, and Gray, however, provide much
insight into why many of the men refused to participate in such work. Dunham, while willing to
engage in work that helped maintain him and his fellows, absolutely refused to engage in work
that would further the war effort. However, hardcore absolutists, such as Harold Gray would
eventually be, believed that any and all work that they did would assist the war effort. Gray
believed that if he cooked his own food, it would relieve a soldier that could be sent to the front
from having to be assigned to cook. Therefore, radical absolutists refused to do any work
whatsoever, because any work that they engaged in, even in the care of themselves, might free
up a soldier from non-combatant service, and therefore, aid in the war effort. Eventually, even
Arthur Dunham would embrace this view, and he would refuse to engage in any work after he
initially arrived at Fort Leavenworth. However, after time in solitary confinement, combined
with the fact that the armistice had been signed and that the U.S. was no longer engaged in the
war in Europe, Dunham did agree to work. However, even so, he would regret leaving solitary
confinement and working in the prison, even if it involved nothing more than symbolically
shoveling dirt, and then, delivering messages a few times each day.
But the refusal of a couple of hundred of COs to the war, and the response of the
government to them, raises a larger question: why did the government feel the need to imprison
COs for refusing to serve in the army? Stated another way, what was at stake for the government
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with regards to conscientious objection? And why did Army officers and soldiers feel the need to
enforce such coercive discipline—to the point of torture, in some cases? This is a much harder
question to answer. As I have mentioned, Capozzola argues that the government had to enforce
cultural norms—that it had to deal with the fact that COs violated clearly established duties
related to citizenship. However, as I have previously explained, Jennifer Keene has shown that
conscription was not a social norm in late Progressive Era America. If this is true, then the
implication is clear: conscription was a norm that Wilson and Congress invented, one that was
needed for America to participate in the war. As such, the government had to disseminate
propaganda that would significantly add to the duties of citizenship. The government did this
through the Committee on Public Information. The CPI transmitted its propaganda in any way
that it could find, including through newspapers, movies, and through the speeches of its Four
Minute Men. In doing so, it created a new discourse in American society, one that required men
to be willing to submit to military service, and even be willing to give up their lives to “make the
world safe for Democracy.” But it also did more than that.
According to the French historian, philosopher, and sociologist Jacques Ellul,
propagandists engage in propaganda with two distinct aims: the first is to either change the mind
of a person or intensify a belief and emotions the person already holds, and the second is to
entice a person to action or inaction, depending upon the target.171 Both modes of propaganda
can clearly be seen operating in the carceral state. But while it is easy to understand that
propaganda can change minds or reinforce what is already believed, how do we explain the drive
to violence that propaganda creates? Ellul states that:
It is a matter of reaching and encircling the whole man and all men. Propaganda tries to surround man by
all possible routes, in the realm of feelings as well as ideas, by playing on his will or on his needs, through
his conscious and his unconscious, assailing him in both his private and public life. It furnishes him with a
171
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complete system for explaining the world, and provides immediate incentives to action. We are here in the
presence of an organized myth that tries to take hold of the entire person. Through the myth it creates,
propaganda imposes a complete range of intuitive knowledge, susceptible of only one interpretation unique
and one-sided and precluding any divergence. This myth becomes so powerful that it invades every area of
consciousness, leaving no faculty or motivation intact. It stimulates in the individual a feeling of
exclusiveness, and produces a biased attitude. The myth has such motive force that, once accepted, it
controls the whole of the individual, who becomes immune to any other influence. This explains the
totalitarian attitude that the individual adopts—where a myth has been successfully created—and that
simply reflects the totalitarian action of propaganda on him.172

This propaganda that created an organizing myth that Ellul speaks of, or what we might call a
worldview, was so powerful that it not only was able to instill in Americans the idea that their
citizenship obligations now included submitting to the draft, but it also instilled the need to act
against those who would dare to reject such obligations. Whether it be the friend of Harold
Gray’s mother who turned him in to the Bureau of Investigation for saying he would never fight,
the soldiers who decided to hang the socialist Herman Kaplan for refusing to work in the Camp
Riley Guard House, or the soldiers who tortured prisoners for days on end at Camp Funston for
their refusal to fight, CPI propaganda worked to transform the mind and motives of many. For
those whom CPI’s propaganda failed to convince, the surveillance of the carceral state, and the
vigilante violence inspired by the propaganda of this state attempted to bring along the rest.
But why? First and foremost, as Michael Kazin has convincingly shown, the vast
majority of Americans were against U.S. participation in the war before, during, and after the
declaration of war by Congress. Wilson knew that in order to raise taxes, to convince Americans
to purchase war bonds and war savings stamps, and to voluntarily register for, and then submit,
to conscription, he had to do more than wave around the Zimmerman Telegram and the German
government’s statement to the United States that it intended to resume unrestricted submarine
warfare. So, Wilson turned to propaganda and coercion in order to obtain compliance with his
wishes. Wilson’s statement, “Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand in our way,”
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which he made to a peace group that had hoped to change his mind, is quite telling in this
regard.173 Wilson would not brook dissent, and would use any means necessary in order to meet
his goals and to bring the entire nation along with him. The use of this propaganda, coupled with
discourses surrounding the obligations of American citizen, and the encouragement of citizens to
keep their friends and neighbors, as well as strangers, under watch, truly created a carceral state.
This state—through its populace—policed the words, actions, and even thoughts of those
opposed to the war, as well as of those whose support did not go far enough. Arthur Dunham,
Evan Thomas, and Harold Gray discovered the power of the carceral state first hand, when they
allowed the duties of sectarianism to dictate their words and actions instead of the duties of
citizenship. Their time in CO barracks, in guard houses, and in prison cells—all because of their
visible dissent to the new citizenship obligation of conscription created by the propaganda of the
carceral state, would forever change their lives.
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Conclusion: Dunham and His Unpublishable Story
Arthur Dunham’s involvement with the carceral state did not end upon his release from
prison. Dunham, a keen observer of people and by training a political scientist and social worker,
quickly put pen to paper and authored his memoirs of his experience with the Army and the war.
Unlike the memoirs of Harold Gray and Evan Thomas, which are more an edited collection of
letters to their families and friends, Dunham took his own letters which survived, and wrote a full
narrative of his experiences, along with commentary. He was bent on recording the actions,
intentions, and results of the carceral state for posterity’s sake.
Dunham set to work writing his memoirs shortly after his release, and he submitted his
manuscript to the leading publishers of his day. Dunham had finished a first draft of his memoirs
as early as September of 1920.174 He revised these with the help of journalist and social activist
Winthrop Lane, and began submitting the finished manuscript to publishers in June of 1922. He
sent the manuscript to MacMillan, Knopf, as well as to many other trade publishers.175 Once
rejections began to roll in, Dunham, at the suggestion of a friend, made inquiries with
periodicals, to see if a magazine or newspaper would be interested in printing his manuscript in
serialized form.176 No one would publish it. Dunham was generally told by the publishers that
they already had too many other books on the war in press, and that they could not handle any
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more books on the topic.177 Dunham followed up with at least one publisher, Knopf, asking
about the viability of publishing the book sometime in the future.178 The editor, Blanche Knopf,
replied but refused to provide him with any advice or her thoughts on the book.179 After many
rejections, Arthur Dunham gave up. To this day, his memoirs sit in a box at the University of
Michigan, occasionally viewed by scholars, or by undergraduate students seeking research
content.
Harold Gray’s memoirs were not published until 1934, and Evan Thomas’ memoirs did
not reach the public until 1974. The reasons why Dunham’s memoirs were not published, but
Gray’s and Thomas’ were, are hard to determine. It could be that, as several publishers told
Dunham, they were simply too overwhelmed with books on the war to be interested in
publishing one more account, especially a set of memoirs written by an unknown prisoner of the
carceral state. More likely, however is the fact that Dunham attempted to publish his memoirs in
the aftermath of the Red Scare, when the carceral state continued to operate in full swing,
seeking out socialists, communists, and IWW members for arrest, incarceration, and deportation
from the United States. Furthermore, soon after the war was over, much of the country became
disillusioned with America’s participation in the conflict. The war did not make the world “Safe
for Democracy,” nor did it end all wars. Congress rejected President Wilson’s plans for a League
of Nations, and the election of Warren Harding—a Republican—as the 29th President of the
United States, was widely seen as a repudiation of Wilson’s conduct of the war. Between an
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oversaturation of books on the war, Dunham’s status as a “slacker” and formerly imprisoned CO,
and the Red Scare, it simply wasn’t the right time to publish Dunham’s memoirs.
The fact that Dunham’s memoir was not published in the 1920s was surely disappointing
to him, but it may have been a disservice to the country as well. The last chapter of Dunham’s
memoir is a critical analysis of “The Problem of the Conscientious Objector.” Dunham, with his
keen eye as a social worker, recognized that solving this problem would not be easy. He saw the
issue as “a combination of two age-old conflicts, the conflict of the heretic with the orthodox
majority, and the conflict of individual freedom with the power of the state.”180 Though he was
somewhat skeptical that the majority were in fact in favor of the war, he was willing to grant that
it was for argument’s sake, and he could see at least three ways of dealing with COs. The first
was “the military method” of dealing with the issue, which was simply to view the CO as a
legally drafted solider who became a recalcitrant military criminal who ought “to be shot at
dawn.” While Dunham was of course not in favor of the military option, he did find that it had
one redeeming quality: “It is straightforward and clear cut.”181
Dunham argued that the government “partially applied” this method, but that it “never
carried the military method to its logical conclusion,” that of legally executed capital
punishment. Instead, the Army sentenced some men to die, but commuted their sentences, and it
allowed soldiers to torment, harass, and even torture COs. Two COs, the Wipf brothers, even
died from the poor treatment that they received at Alcatraz, but their deaths were not carried out
by the juridical decisions of the government, but instead by the carceral state that encouraged
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citizen-soldiers to inform on, harass, and otherwise harm those who refused to comply.182
The second method that Dunham identified was the “Legal Method,” which viewed COs
as violators of the Selective Service Act, and therefore, federal civilian offenders who should be
arrested, tried, and imprisoned by civil authorities. The government did embrace this tactic to an
extent, when it arrested and then incarcerated draft evaders, but then, after their year in a civilian
jail was finished, turned them over to the military to be conscripted. Dunham noted that one of
the advantages to the legal method was that most civilian prisoners did not refuse to work, as
their work did not further the war effort.183
The third technique that Dunham identified was the “social case-work” method, which
involved a social worker in “the process of adjusting an individual to his environment so that he
may function more happily, usefully, and successfully as a member of the community.”184
According to Dunham, conscientious objection was seen in social work theory as a form of
“social maladjustment,” which should be treatable through scientific methods. Dunham argued
that the government applied this method in part, “and probably unconsciously,” when it
attempted to offer COs different “alternative environments,” such as non-combatant service,
farm furloughs, and the like.185
Dunham did not mince words in his evaluation of how the government applied the social
work method. He declared, “The supreme stupidity and inefficiency of the government in
dealing with the C.O. lay in the fact that before attempting to apply the principle of alternative
environments to the C.O., the government first plunged the C.O. into the military environment
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where it was morally certain there would be injustice and brutality toward the C.O. and immense
waste of time for the army.”186 Dunham believed that a CO should never see the inside of any
type of military facility. Placing a CO in an Army camp, and calling him a solider, in a place
where a solider was expected to obey all orders without thinking, could result in nothing but
disaster, especially since the COs explicitly reserved their own judgment with regards to what
they believed was moral and ethical. Placing a CO in the military ensured that “the C.O. was
forced, by his position as a C.O., to draw lines and make decisions,” something that would never
be tolerated by a regular private solider. Dunham argued that placing the CO, who had to make
these decisions, within the military then required the Army to act, because to ignore such
conduct would undermine military discipline.187 Dunham interpreted President Wilson’s order
regarding the treatment of COs as requiring the Army to practice social casework. However,
since Army officers were not trained as social workers, and since many of them did not have the
temperament for such work, it was destined to fail. Dunham did note, however, that some
officers were able to work well with COs, mostly because of their own “native ability,” and not
because the Army provided them with training or clear-cut regulations on how to proceed.188
Dunham argued that if the social casework method had been correctly applied, the Funston
Outrages, as well as the torture and mistreatment that many COs suffered, would never have
occurred. It also would have also saved the Army much time, money, and headaches.189
Dunham also noted that, out of almost 4,000 COs that were finally inducted into the
Army, the military court-martialed 450 or so of them as absolutists. Dunham did not believe that
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all of these men were actually absolutists, however. Instead, many of them were pushed, like
him, into making decisions that led to being court-martialed, especially since the Army did not
offer most of these men alterative service, such as farm furloughs.190
Ultimately, Dunham believed that a hybrid of the legal method and the case work method
should be applied to future wars where conscription occurred. First, he believed that the
government would have to evaluate the sincerity of conscientious objectors to military service.
He acknowledged that a board appointed to this task would have a difficult job ahead of them,
but he thought it would be less work than a full criminal trial. He also argued that, unlike the
military tribunals that only took mere minutes to pass judgement on sincerity, these boards
would have to take real time and make real effort to probe the sincerity of COs. He also argued
that all COs should be given options for alternative service, and that they should never see the
inside of a military camp. He believed this would largely solve the CO problem, except for a
small number of absolutists that rejected all conscripted labor.191
Finally, Dunham argued that none of the methods would work for absolutist COs. He
believed that absolutists should be “exempted from all military and alternative service on the
grounds of absolute conscientious objection against war.” Dunham recognized that objections
would be made to a policy such as this, including the fact that it was unfair to the rest of the men
who were conscripted, and that it would “put a premium upon absolutism.”192 Dunham countered
with the fact that any type of exemption from combat was “inconsistent with the strict logic and
rigid application of the conscription principle. The truth of the matter is, of course, that
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conscription and personal freedom are exact opposites.”193 Therefore, he saw no real problem
with providing full exemption for absolutists if the Army was willing to provide combat
exemptions for other COs. As for the contention that granting full exemptions to absolutists
would intolerably grow the absolutist pool, Dunham rejected this idea. He pointed to the small
number of COs who were actually inducted into the Army, arguing instead that the apparatus of
the carceral state, “publicity, public opinion, and social pressure” would keep most men from
declaring themselves to be absolutists. Furthermore, he believed, most COs would be more than
willing to demonstrate both their sincerity and their conscientious scruples by performing
alternative service. Ultimately, however, Dunham argued that instead of fixing the problem of
how COs are dealt with, the government should focus on fixing the problem of how COs are
created: the act of going to war in the first place.194
Since Dunham’s manuscript did not see the light of day, his arguments for how to
properly treat COs during the next war did not receive a fair hearing. However, while his written
words did not appear in public, the sentiment behind them most certainly did. Dunham’s ideas
and alternatives were in the air. Numerous tracts, articles, and other published sources argued for
alternative ways to treat COs. This discourse appears to have had some effect. While the
government did not fully embrace Dunham’s scheme, it did deal with COs in a more humane
manner during the Second World War. The government largely put the Society of Friends—or
the Quakers—in charge of COs during World War II, creating Civilian Public Service Corps
camps—modeled on New Deal CCC camps—as an alternative environment for COs.195
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Dunham’s written memoirs did not help this come about, but the national discourse of which he
was a part most certainly helped implement this more humane alternative for dealing with COs.
The implementation of the carceral state—of neighbors spying on neighbors, of people
policing themselves, and of the government using coercion when necessary—became less and
less popular in the years after the war. A rejection of pure coercion, or at least, a lessening of it,
can be clearly seen in the New Deal in the years following World War I. Historians of the New
Deal and the Second World War such as Sarah T. Phillips, James Sparrow, and Meg Jacobs have
emphasized the voluntary nature of many of the regulatory programs that sprung up to deal with
the Great Depression and then the war.196 Sarah Phillips argues that FDR—who had been an
official in Woodrow Wilson’s administration and a disciple of the former President—sought to
implement largely voluntary programs in order to ensure that the New Deal would “gain
widespread political acceptance.” However, she also notes that many of these policies ultimately
did not achieve their goals, because there was little to compel people to comply.197 It may be that
the heavy coercive power that Woodrow Wilson wielded during the years that America was
involved in Europe’s war constrained FDR’s political options during the New Deal and during
America’s second excursion into European warfare. It certainly appears to have done so with
regards to COs during World War II. In that sense, maybe the experiences of men like Arthur
Dunham, Evan Thomas, and Harold Gray were not fully wasted after all.
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